Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games with Complementarities and Beyond

Fuente: arXiv
Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Takazawa, Kenjiro
Format: Preprint
Published: 2024
Subjects:
Online Access:
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
_version_ 1866909065024634880
author Takazawa, Kenjiro
author_facet Takazawa, Kenjiro
contents Congestion games offer a primary model in the study of pure Nash equilibria in non-cooperative games, and a number of generalized models have been proposed in the literature. One line of generalization includes weighted congestion games, in which the cost of a resource is a function of the total weight of the players choosing that resource. Another line includes congestion games with mixed costs, in which the cost imposed on a player is a convex combination of the total cost and the maximum cost of the resources in her strategy. This model is further generalized to that of congestion games with complementarities. For the above models, the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium is proved under some assumptions, including that the strategy space of each player is the base family of a matroid and that the cost functions have a certain kind of monotonicity. In this paper, we deal with common generalizations of these two lines, namely weighted matroid congestion games with complementarities, and its further generalization. Our main technical contribution is a proof of the existence of pure Nash equilibria in these generalized models under a simplified assumption on the monotonicity, which provide a common extension of the previous results. We also present some extensions on the existence of pure Nash equilibria in player-specific and weighted matroid congestion games with mixed costs.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2401_03861
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games with Complementarities and Beyond
Takazawa, Kenjiro
Computer Science and Game Theory
Discrete Mathematics
Combinatorics
Congestion games offer a primary model in the study of pure Nash equilibria in non-cooperative games, and a number of generalized models have been proposed in the literature. One line of generalization includes weighted congestion games, in which the cost of a resource is a function of the total weight of the players choosing that resource. Another line includes congestion games with mixed costs, in which the cost imposed on a player is a convex combination of the total cost and the maximum cost of the resources in her strategy. This model is further generalized to that of congestion games with complementarities. For the above models, the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium is proved under some assumptions, including that the strategy space of each player is the base family of a matroid and that the cost functions have a certain kind of monotonicity. In this paper, we deal with common generalizations of these two lines, namely weighted matroid congestion games with complementarities, and its further generalization. Our main technical contribution is a proof of the existence of pure Nash equilibria in these generalized models under a simplified assumption on the monotonicity, which provide a common extension of the previous results. We also present some extensions on the existence of pure Nash equilibria in player-specific and weighted matroid congestion games with mixed costs.
title Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games with Complementarities and Beyond
topic Computer Science and Game Theory
Discrete Mathematics
Combinatorics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.03861