Should Politicians be Informed? Targeted Benefits and Heterogeneous Voters
Fuente:
arXiv
Guardado en:
| Autores principales: | , |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2024
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | |
| Etiquetas: |
Agregar Etiqueta
Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!
|
| _version_ | 1866929203972145152 |
|---|---|
| author | Senkov, Maxim Samsonov, Arseniy |
| author_facet | Senkov, Maxim Samsonov, Arseniy |
| contents | We compare two scenarios in a model where politicians offer local public goods to heterogeneous voters: one where politicians have access to data on voters and thus can target specific ones, and another where politicians only decide on the level of spending. When the budget is small, or the public good has a high value, access to voter information leads the winner to focus on poorer voters, enhancing voter welfare. With a larger budget or less crucial public goods, politicians target a narrow group of swing voters, which harms the voter welfare. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2401_04273 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Should Politicians be Informed? Targeted Benefits and Heterogeneous Voters Senkov, Maxim Samsonov, Arseniy Theoretical Economics We compare two scenarios in a model where politicians offer local public goods to heterogeneous voters: one where politicians have access to data on voters and thus can target specific ones, and another where politicians only decide on the level of spending. When the budget is small, or the public good has a high value, access to voter information leads the winner to focus on poorer voters, enhancing voter welfare. With a larger budget or less crucial public goods, politicians target a narrow group of swing voters, which harms the voter welfare. |
| title | Should Politicians be Informed? Targeted Benefits and Heterogeneous Voters |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.04273 |