An impossibility theorem concerning positive involvement in voting
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autor principal: | |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866916665288032256 |
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| author | Holliday, Wesley H. |
| author_facet | Holliday, Wesley H. |
| contents | In social choice theory with ordinal preferences, a voting method satisfies the axiom of positive involvement if adding to a preference profile a voter who ranks an alternative uniquely first cannot cause that alternative to go from winning to losing. In this note, we prove a new impossibility theorem concerning this axiom: there is no ordinal voting method satisfying positive involvement that also satisfies the Condorcet winner and loser criteria, resolvability, and a common invariance property for Condorcet methods, namely that the choice of winners depends only on the ordering of majority margins by size. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2401_05657 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | An impossibility theorem concerning positive involvement in voting Holliday, Wesley H. Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory Multiagent Systems 91B12, 91B14, 91B10 I.2.11 In social choice theory with ordinal preferences, a voting method satisfies the axiom of positive involvement if adding to a preference profile a voter who ranks an alternative uniquely first cannot cause that alternative to go from winning to losing. In this note, we prove a new impossibility theorem concerning this axiom: there is no ordinal voting method satisfying positive involvement that also satisfies the Condorcet winner and loser criteria, resolvability, and a common invariance property for Condorcet methods, namely that the choice of winners depends only on the ordering of majority margins by size. |
| title | An impossibility theorem concerning positive involvement in voting |
| topic | Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory Multiagent Systems 91B12, 91B14, 91B10 I.2.11 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.05657 |