Maximum Causal Entropy IRL in Mean-Field Games and GNEP Framework for Forward RL

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Anahtarci, Berkay, Kariksiz, Can Deha, Saldi, Naci
Format: Preprint
Published: 2024
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author Anahtarci, Berkay
Kariksiz, Can Deha
Saldi, Naci
author_facet Anahtarci, Berkay
Kariksiz, Can Deha
Saldi, Naci
contents This paper explores the use of Maximum Causal Entropy Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL) within the context of discrete-time stationary Mean-Field Games (MFGs) characterized by finite state spaces and an infinite-horizon, discounted-reward setting. Although the resulting optimization problem is non-convex with respect to policies, we reformulate it as a convex optimization problem in terms of state-action occupation measures by leveraging the linear programming framework of Markov Decision Processes. Based on this convex reformulation, we introduce a gradient descent algorithm with a guaranteed convergence rate to efficiently compute the optimal solution. Moreover, we develop a new method that conceptualizes the MFG problem as a Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem (GNEP), enabling effective computation of the mean-field equilibrium for forward reinforcement learning (RL) problems and marking an advancement in MFG solution techniques. We further illustrate the practical applicability of our GNEP approach by employing this algorithm to generate data for numerical MFG examples.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2401_06566
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Maximum Causal Entropy IRL in Mean-Field Games and GNEP Framework for Forward RL
Anahtarci, Berkay
Kariksiz, Can Deha
Saldi, Naci
Systems and Control
Machine Learning
Optimization and Control
This paper explores the use of Maximum Causal Entropy Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL) within the context of discrete-time stationary Mean-Field Games (MFGs) characterized by finite state spaces and an infinite-horizon, discounted-reward setting. Although the resulting optimization problem is non-convex with respect to policies, we reformulate it as a convex optimization problem in terms of state-action occupation measures by leveraging the linear programming framework of Markov Decision Processes. Based on this convex reformulation, we introduce a gradient descent algorithm with a guaranteed convergence rate to efficiently compute the optimal solution. Moreover, we develop a new method that conceptualizes the MFG problem as a Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem (GNEP), enabling effective computation of the mean-field equilibrium for forward reinforcement learning (RL) problems and marking an advancement in MFG solution techniques. We further illustrate the practical applicability of our GNEP approach by employing this algorithm to generate data for numerical MFG examples.
title Maximum Causal Entropy IRL in Mean-Field Games and GNEP Framework for Forward RL
topic Systems and Control
Machine Learning
Optimization and Control
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.06566