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Main Authors: Liang, Jia-Wei, Amenta, Nina
Format: Preprint
Published: 2024
Subjects:
Online Access:https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.07440
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author Liang, Jia-Wei
Amenta, Nina
author_facet Liang, Jia-Wei
Amenta, Nina
contents We explore the fairness of a redistricting game introduced by Mixon and Villar, which provides a two-party protocol for dividing a state into electoral districts, without the participation of an independent authority. We analyze the game in an abstract setting that ignores the geographic distribution of voters and assumes that voter preferences are fixed and known. We show that the minority player can always win at least $p-1$ districts, where $p$ is proportional to the percentage of minority voters. We give an upper bound on the number of districts won by the minority based on a "cracking" strategy for the majority.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2401_07440
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle The Fairness of Redistricting Ghost
Liang, Jia-Wei
Amenta, Nina
Computer Science and Game Theory
We explore the fairness of a redistricting game introduced by Mixon and Villar, which provides a two-party protocol for dividing a state into electoral districts, without the participation of an independent authority. We analyze the game in an abstract setting that ignores the geographic distribution of voters and assumes that voter preferences are fixed and known. We show that the minority player can always win at least $p-1$ districts, where $p$ is proportional to the percentage of minority voters. We give an upper bound on the number of districts won by the minority based on a "cracking" strategy for the majority.
title The Fairness of Redistricting Ghost
topic Computer Science and Game Theory
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.07440