A techno-economic model for avoiding conflicts of interest between owners of offshore wind farms and maintenance suppliers
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arXiv
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2024
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| author | Marugán, Alberto Pliego Márquez, Fausto Pedro García Pérez, Jesús María Pinar |
| author_facet | Marugán, Alberto Pliego Márquez, Fausto Pedro García Pérez, Jesús María Pinar |
| contents | Currently, wind energy is one of the most important sources of renewable energy. Offshore locations for wind turbines are increasingly exploited because of their numerous advantages. However, offshore wind farms require high investment in maintenance service. Due to its complexity and special requirements, maintenance service is usually outsourced by wind farm owners. In this paper, we propose a novel approach to determine, quantify, and reduce the possible conflicts of interest between owners and maintenance suppliers. We created a complete techno-economic model to address this problem from an impartial point of view. An iterative process was developed to obtain statistical results that can help stakeholders negotiate the terms of the contract, in which the availability of the wind farm is the reference parameter by which to determine penalisations and incentives. Moreover, a multi-objective programming problem was addressed that maximises the profits of both parties without losing the alignment of their interests. The main scientific contribution of this paper is the maintenance analysis of offshore wind farms from two perspectives: that of the owner and the maintenance supplier. This analysis evaluates the conflicts of interest of both parties. In addition, we demonstrate that proper adjustment of some parameters, such as penalisation, incentives, and resources, and adequate control of availability can help reduce this conflict of interests. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2401_08251 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | A techno-economic model for avoiding conflicts of interest between owners of offshore wind farms and maintenance suppliers Marugán, Alberto Pliego Márquez, Fausto Pedro García Pérez, Jesús María Pinar Computer Science and Game Theory Systems and Control General Economics Economics Currently, wind energy is one of the most important sources of renewable energy. Offshore locations for wind turbines are increasingly exploited because of their numerous advantages. However, offshore wind farms require high investment in maintenance service. Due to its complexity and special requirements, maintenance service is usually outsourced by wind farm owners. In this paper, we propose a novel approach to determine, quantify, and reduce the possible conflicts of interest between owners and maintenance suppliers. We created a complete techno-economic model to address this problem from an impartial point of view. An iterative process was developed to obtain statistical results that can help stakeholders negotiate the terms of the contract, in which the availability of the wind farm is the reference parameter by which to determine penalisations and incentives. Moreover, a multi-objective programming problem was addressed that maximises the profits of both parties without losing the alignment of their interests. The main scientific contribution of this paper is the maintenance analysis of offshore wind farms from two perspectives: that of the owner and the maintenance supplier. This analysis evaluates the conflicts of interest of both parties. In addition, we demonstrate that proper adjustment of some parameters, such as penalisation, incentives, and resources, and adequate control of availability can help reduce this conflict of interests. |
| title | A techno-economic model for avoiding conflicts of interest between owners of offshore wind farms and maintenance suppliers |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Systems and Control General Economics Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.08251 |