IRS-Enhanced Anti-Jamming Precoding Against DISCO Physical Layer Jamming Attacks
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arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866909075699138560 |
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| author | Huang, Huan Zhang, Hongliang Cai, Yi Zhang, Yunjing Swindlehurst, A. Lee Han, Zhu |
| author_facet | Huang, Huan Zhang, Hongliang Cai, Yi Zhang, Yunjing Swindlehurst, A. Lee Han, Zhu |
| contents | Illegitimate intelligent reflective surfaces (IRSs) can pose significant physical layer security risks on multi-user multiple-input single-output (MU-MISO) systems. Recently, a DISCO approach has been proposed an illegitimate IRS with random and time-varying reflection coefficients, referred to as a "disco" IRS (DIRS). Such DIRS can attack MU-MISO systems without relying on either jamming power or channel state information (CSI), and classical anti-jamming techniques are ineffective for the DIRS-based fully-passive jammers (DIRS-based FPJs). In this paper, we propose an IRS-enhanced anti-jamming precoder against DIRS-based FPJs that requires only statistical rather than instantaneous CSI of the DIRS-jammed channels. Specifically, a legitimate IRS is introduced to reduce the strength of the DIRS-based jamming relative to the transmit signals at a legitimate user (LU). In addition, the active beamforming at the legitimate access point (AP) is designed to maximize the signal-to-jamming-plus-noise ratios (SJNRs). Numerical results are presented to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed IRS-enhanced anti-jamming precoder against DIRS-based FPJs. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2401_09036 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | IRS-Enhanced Anti-Jamming Precoding Against DISCO Physical Layer Jamming Attacks Huang, Huan Zhang, Hongliang Cai, Yi Zhang, Yunjing Swindlehurst, A. Lee Han, Zhu Information Theory Signal Processing Illegitimate intelligent reflective surfaces (IRSs) can pose significant physical layer security risks on multi-user multiple-input single-output (MU-MISO) systems. Recently, a DISCO approach has been proposed an illegitimate IRS with random and time-varying reflection coefficients, referred to as a "disco" IRS (DIRS). Such DIRS can attack MU-MISO systems without relying on either jamming power or channel state information (CSI), and classical anti-jamming techniques are ineffective for the DIRS-based fully-passive jammers (DIRS-based FPJs). In this paper, we propose an IRS-enhanced anti-jamming precoder against DIRS-based FPJs that requires only statistical rather than instantaneous CSI of the DIRS-jammed channels. Specifically, a legitimate IRS is introduced to reduce the strength of the DIRS-based jamming relative to the transmit signals at a legitimate user (LU). In addition, the active beamforming at the legitimate access point (AP) is designed to maximize the signal-to-jamming-plus-noise ratios (SJNRs). Numerical results are presented to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed IRS-enhanced anti-jamming precoder against DIRS-based FPJs. |
| title | IRS-Enhanced Anti-Jamming Precoding Against DISCO Physical Layer Jamming Attacks |
| topic | Information Theory Signal Processing |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.09036 |