Receding Horizon Games for Modeling Competitive Supply Chains
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arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866913474856091648 |
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| author | Hall, Sophie Guerrini, Laura Dörfler, Florian Liao-McPherson, Dominic |
| author_facet | Hall, Sophie Guerrini, Laura Dörfler, Florian Liao-McPherson, Dominic |
| contents | The vast majority of products we use daily are supplied to us through complex global supply chains that transform raw materials into finished goods and distribute them to end consumers. This paper proposes a modeling methodology for dynamic competitive supply chains based on game theory and model predictive control. We model each manufacturer in the supply chain as a rational utility maximizing agent that selects their actions by finding an open-loop generalized Nash equilibrium of a multi-stage game. To react to competitors and the state of the market, every agent re-plans their actions in a receding horizon manner based on estimates of market and supplier parameters thereby creating an approximate closed-loop equilibrium policy. We demonstrate through numerical simulations that this modeling approach is computationally tractable and generates economically interpretable behaviors in a variety of settings such as demand spikes, supply shocks, and information asymmetry. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2401_09853 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Receding Horizon Games for Modeling Competitive Supply Chains Hall, Sophie Guerrini, Laura Dörfler, Florian Liao-McPherson, Dominic Systems and Control The vast majority of products we use daily are supplied to us through complex global supply chains that transform raw materials into finished goods and distribute them to end consumers. This paper proposes a modeling methodology for dynamic competitive supply chains based on game theory and model predictive control. We model each manufacturer in the supply chain as a rational utility maximizing agent that selects their actions by finding an open-loop generalized Nash equilibrium of a multi-stage game. To react to competitors and the state of the market, every agent re-plans their actions in a receding horizon manner based on estimates of market and supplier parameters thereby creating an approximate closed-loop equilibrium policy. We demonstrate through numerical simulations that this modeling approach is computationally tractable and generates economically interpretable behaviors in a variety of settings such as demand spikes, supply shocks, and information asymmetry. |
| title | Receding Horizon Games for Modeling Competitive Supply Chains |
| topic | Systems and Control |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.09853 |