An Experimental Comparison of Multiwinner Voting Rules on Approval Elections
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866929218370142208 |
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| author | Faliszewski, Piotr Lackner, Martin Sornat, Krzysztof Szufa, Stanisław |
| author_facet | Faliszewski, Piotr Lackner, Martin Sornat, Krzysztof Szufa, Stanisław |
| contents | In this paper, we experimentally compare major approval-based
multiwinner voting rules. To this end, we define a measure of
similarity between two equal-sized committees subject to a given
election. Using synthetic elections coming from several
distributions, we analyze how similar are the committees provided by
prominent voting rules. Our results can be visualized as ``maps of
voting rules'', which provide a counterpoint to a purely axiomatic
classification of voting rules.
The strength of our proposed method is its independence from preimposed classifications (such as the satisfaction of concrete axioms),
and that it indeed offers a much finer distinction than
the current state of axiomatic analysis. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2401_11870 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | An Experimental Comparison of Multiwinner Voting Rules on Approval Elections Faliszewski, Piotr Lackner, Martin Sornat, Krzysztof Szufa, Stanisław Computer Science and Game Theory In this paper, we experimentally compare major approval-based multiwinner voting rules. To this end, we define a measure of similarity between two equal-sized committees subject to a given election. Using synthetic elections coming from several distributions, we analyze how similar are the committees provided by prominent voting rules. Our results can be visualized as ``maps of voting rules'', which provide a counterpoint to a purely axiomatic classification of voting rules. The strength of our proposed method is its independence from preimposed classifications (such as the satisfaction of concrete axioms), and that it indeed offers a much finer distinction than the current state of axiomatic analysis. |
| title | An Experimental Comparison of Multiwinner Voting Rules on Approval Elections |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.11870 |