Hypochaos prevents tragedy of the commons in discrete-time eco-evolutionary game dynamics
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2024
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| _version_ | 1866911762899533824 |
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| author | Mondal, Samrat Sohel Ray, Avishuman Chakraborty, Sagar |
| author_facet | Mondal, Samrat Sohel Ray, Avishuman Chakraborty, Sagar |
| contents | While quite a few recent papers have explored game-resource feedback using the framework of evolutionary game theory, almost all the studies are confined to using time-continuous dynamical equations. Moreover, in such literature, the effect of ubiquitous chaos in the resulting eco-evolutionary dynamics is rather missing. Here, we present a deterministic eco-evolutionary discrete-time dynamics in generation-wise non-overlapping population of two types of harvesters, one harvesting at a faster rate than the other, consuming a self-renewing resource capable of showing chaotic dynamics. In the light of our finding that sometimes chaos is confined exclusively to either the dynamics of the resource or that of the consumer fractions, an interesting scenario is realized: The resource state can keep oscillating chaotically, and hence, it does not vanish to result in the tragedy of the commons, extinction of the resource due to selfish indiscriminate exploitation, and yet the consumer population, whose dynamics depends directly on the state of the resource, may end up being composed exclusively of defectors, i.e., high harvesters. This appears non-intuitive because it is well known that prevention of tragedy of the commons usually requires substantial cooperation to be present. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2401_12245 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Hypochaos prevents tragedy of the commons in discrete-time eco-evolutionary game dynamics Mondal, Samrat Sohel Ray, Avishuman Chakraborty, Sagar Populations and Evolution Adaptation and Self-Organizing Systems While quite a few recent papers have explored game-resource feedback using the framework of evolutionary game theory, almost all the studies are confined to using time-continuous dynamical equations. Moreover, in such literature, the effect of ubiquitous chaos in the resulting eco-evolutionary dynamics is rather missing. Here, we present a deterministic eco-evolutionary discrete-time dynamics in generation-wise non-overlapping population of two types of harvesters, one harvesting at a faster rate than the other, consuming a self-renewing resource capable of showing chaotic dynamics. In the light of our finding that sometimes chaos is confined exclusively to either the dynamics of the resource or that of the consumer fractions, an interesting scenario is realized: The resource state can keep oscillating chaotically, and hence, it does not vanish to result in the tragedy of the commons, extinction of the resource due to selfish indiscriminate exploitation, and yet the consumer population, whose dynamics depends directly on the state of the resource, may end up being composed exclusively of defectors, i.e., high harvesters. This appears non-intuitive because it is well known that prevention of tragedy of the commons usually requires substantial cooperation to be present. |
| title | Hypochaos prevents tragedy of the commons in discrete-time eco-evolutionary game dynamics |
| topic | Populations and Evolution Adaptation and Self-Organizing Systems |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.12245 |