Emergent Cooperation under Uncertain Incentive Alignment

Fuente: arXiv
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Autori principali: Orzan, Nicole, Acar, Erman, Grossi, Davide, Rădulescu, Roxana
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2024
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author Orzan, Nicole
Acar, Erman
Grossi, Davide
Rădulescu, Roxana
author_facet Orzan, Nicole
Acar, Erman
Grossi, Davide
Rădulescu, Roxana
contents Understanding the emergence of cooperation in systems of computational agents is crucial for the development of effective cooperative AI. Interaction among individuals in real-world settings are often sparse and occur within a broad spectrum of incentives, which often are only partially known. In this work, we explore how cooperation can arise among reinforcement learning agents in scenarios characterised by infrequent encounters, and where agents face uncertainty about the alignment of their incentives with those of others. To do so, we train the agents under a wide spectrum of environments ranging from fully competitive, to fully cooperative, to mixed-motives. Under this type of uncertainty we study the effects of mechanisms, such as reputation and intrinsic rewards, that have been proposed in the literature to foster cooperation in mixed-motives environments. Our findings show that uncertainty substantially lowers the agents' ability to engage in cooperative behaviour, when that would be the best course of action. In this scenario, the use of effective reputation mechanisms and intrinsic rewards boosts the agents' capability to act nearly-optimally in cooperative environments, while greatly enhancing cooperation in mixed-motive environments as well.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2401_12646
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Emergent Cooperation under Uncertain Incentive Alignment
Orzan, Nicole
Acar, Erman
Grossi, Davide
Rădulescu, Roxana
Multiagent Systems
Artificial Intelligence
Computer Science and Game Theory
Understanding the emergence of cooperation in systems of computational agents is crucial for the development of effective cooperative AI. Interaction among individuals in real-world settings are often sparse and occur within a broad spectrum of incentives, which often are only partially known. In this work, we explore how cooperation can arise among reinforcement learning agents in scenarios characterised by infrequent encounters, and where agents face uncertainty about the alignment of their incentives with those of others. To do so, we train the agents under a wide spectrum of environments ranging from fully competitive, to fully cooperative, to mixed-motives. Under this type of uncertainty we study the effects of mechanisms, such as reputation and intrinsic rewards, that have been proposed in the literature to foster cooperation in mixed-motives environments. Our findings show that uncertainty substantially lowers the agents' ability to engage in cooperative behaviour, when that would be the best course of action. In this scenario, the use of effective reputation mechanisms and intrinsic rewards boosts the agents' capability to act nearly-optimally in cooperative environments, while greatly enhancing cooperation in mixed-motive environments as well.
title Emergent Cooperation under Uncertain Incentive Alignment
topic Multiagent Systems
Artificial Intelligence
Computer Science and Game Theory
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.12646