Optimal Evasion from a Sensing-Limited Pursuer
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , , , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2024
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | |
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| _version_ | 1866911763148046336 |
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| author | Maity, Dipankar Von Moll, Alexander Shishika, Daigo Dorothy, Michael |
| author_facet | Maity, Dipankar Von Moll, Alexander Shishika, Daigo Dorothy, Michael |
| contents | This paper investigates a partial-information pursuit evasion game in which the Pursuer has a limited-range sensor to detect the Evader. Given a fixed final time, we derive the optimal evasion strategy for the Evader to maximize its distance from the pursuer at the end. Our analysis reveals that in certain parametric regimes, the optimal Evasion strategy involves a 'risky' maneuver, where the Evader's trajectory comes extremely close to the pursuer's sensing boundary before moving behind the Pursuer. Additionally, we explore a special case in which the Pursuer can choose the final time. In this scenario, we determine a (Nash) equilibrium pair for both the final time and the evasion strategy. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2401_12848 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Optimal Evasion from a Sensing-Limited Pursuer Maity, Dipankar Von Moll, Alexander Shishika, Daigo Dorothy, Michael Computer Science and Game Theory Systems and Control This paper investigates a partial-information pursuit evasion game in which the Pursuer has a limited-range sensor to detect the Evader. Given a fixed final time, we derive the optimal evasion strategy for the Evader to maximize its distance from the pursuer at the end. Our analysis reveals that in certain parametric regimes, the optimal Evasion strategy involves a 'risky' maneuver, where the Evader's trajectory comes extremely close to the pursuer's sensing boundary before moving behind the Pursuer. Additionally, we explore a special case in which the Pursuer can choose the final time. In this scenario, we determine a (Nash) equilibrium pair for both the final time and the evasion strategy. |
| title | Optimal Evasion from a Sensing-Limited Pursuer |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Systems and Control |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.12848 |