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Regulation of Algorithmic Collusion

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Hartline, Jason D., Long, Sheng, Zhang, Chenhao
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2024
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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