Querying Fault and Attack Trees: Property Specification on a Water Network
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2024
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| author | Nicoletti, Stefano M. Lopuhaä-Zwakenberg, Milan Hahn, E. Moritz Stoelinga, Mariëlle |
| author_facet | Nicoletti, Stefano M. Lopuhaä-Zwakenberg, Milan Hahn, E. Moritz Stoelinga, Mariëlle |
| contents | We provide an overview of three different query languages whose objective is to specify properties on the highly popular formalisms of fault trees (FTs) and attack trees (ATs). These are BFL, a Boolean Logic for FTs, PFL, a probabilistic extension of BFL and ATM, a logic for security metrics on ATs. We validate the framework composed by these three logics by applying them to the case study of a water distribution network. We extend the FT for this network - found in the literature - and we propose to model the system under analysis with the Fault Trees/Attack Trees (FT/ATs) formalism, combining both FTs and ATs in a unique model. Furthermore, we propose a novel combination of the showcased logics to account for queries that jointly consider both the FT and the AT of the model, integrating influences of attacks on failure probabilities of different components. Finally, we extend the domain specific language for PFL with novel constructs to capture the interplay between metrics of attacks - e.g., "cost", success probabilities - and failure probabilities in the system. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2401_16015 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Querying Fault and Attack Trees: Property Specification on a Water Network Nicoletti, Stefano M. Lopuhaä-Zwakenberg, Milan Hahn, E. Moritz Stoelinga, Mariëlle Logic in Computer Science We provide an overview of three different query languages whose objective is to specify properties on the highly popular formalisms of fault trees (FTs) and attack trees (ATs). These are BFL, a Boolean Logic for FTs, PFL, a probabilistic extension of BFL and ATM, a logic for security metrics on ATs. We validate the framework composed by these three logics by applying them to the case study of a water distribution network. We extend the FT for this network - found in the literature - and we propose to model the system under analysis with the Fault Trees/Attack Trees (FT/ATs) formalism, combining both FTs and ATs in a unique model. Furthermore, we propose a novel combination of the showcased logics to account for queries that jointly consider both the FT and the AT of the model, integrating influences of attacks on failure probabilities of different components. Finally, we extend the domain specific language for PFL with novel constructs to capture the interplay between metrics of attacks - e.g., "cost", success probabilities - and failure probabilities in the system. |
| title | Querying Fault and Attack Trees: Property Specification on a Water Network |
| topic | Logic in Computer Science |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.16015 |