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Contracting with a Learning Agent

Fuente: arXiv

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Guruganesh, Guru, Kolumbus, Yoav, Schneider, Jon, Talgam-Cohen, Inbal, Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis, Emmanouil-Vasileios, Wang, Joshua R., Weinberg, S. Matthew
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2024
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory Artificial Intelligence Machine Learning Theoretical Economics
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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