Assessing the Benefits and Risks of Quantum Computers
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2024
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| author | Scholten, Travis L. Williams, Carl J. Moody, Dustin Mosca, Michele Hurley, William Zeng, William J. Troyer, Matthias Gambetta, Jay M. |
| author_facet | Scholten, Travis L. Williams, Carl J. Moody, Dustin Mosca, Michele Hurley, William Zeng, William J. Troyer, Matthias Gambetta, Jay M. |
| contents | Quantum computing is an emerging technology with potentially far-reaching implications for national prosperity and security. Understanding the timeframes over which economic benefits and national security risks may manifest themselves is vital for ensuring the prudent development of this technology. To inform security experts and policy decision makers on this matter, we review what is currently known on the potential uses and risks of quantum computers, leveraging current research literature.
The maturity of currently-available quantum computers is not yet at a level such that they can be used in production for large-scale, industrially-relevant problems, and they are not believed to currently pose security risks. We identify 2 large-scale trends -- new approximate methods (variational algorithms, error mitigation, and circuit knitting) and the commercial exploration of business-relevant quantum applications -- which, together, may enable useful and practical quantum computing in the near future.
Crucially, these methods do not appear likely to change the required resources for cryptanalysis on currently-used cryptosystems. From an analysis we perform of the current and known algorithms for cryptanalysis, we find they require circuits of a size exceeding those that can be run by current and near-future quantum computers (and which will require error correction), though we acknowledge improvements in quantum algorithms for these problems are taking place in the literature. In addition, the risk to cybersecurity can be well-managed by the migration to new, quantum-safe cryptographic protocols, which we survey and discuss.
Given the above, we conclude there is a credible expectation that quantum computers will be capable of performing computations which are economically-impactful before they will be capable of performing ones which are cryptographically-relevant. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2401_16317 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Assessing the Benefits and Risks of Quantum Computers Scholten, Travis L. Williams, Carl J. Moody, Dustin Mosca, Michele Hurley, William Zeng, William J. Troyer, Matthias Gambetta, Jay M. Quantum Physics Physics and Society Quantum computing is an emerging technology with potentially far-reaching implications for national prosperity and security. Understanding the timeframes over which economic benefits and national security risks may manifest themselves is vital for ensuring the prudent development of this technology. To inform security experts and policy decision makers on this matter, we review what is currently known on the potential uses and risks of quantum computers, leveraging current research literature. The maturity of currently-available quantum computers is not yet at a level such that they can be used in production for large-scale, industrially-relevant problems, and they are not believed to currently pose security risks. We identify 2 large-scale trends -- new approximate methods (variational algorithms, error mitigation, and circuit knitting) and the commercial exploration of business-relevant quantum applications -- which, together, may enable useful and practical quantum computing in the near future. Crucially, these methods do not appear likely to change the required resources for cryptanalysis on currently-used cryptosystems. From an analysis we perform of the current and known algorithms for cryptanalysis, we find they require circuits of a size exceeding those that can be run by current and near-future quantum computers (and which will require error correction), though we acknowledge improvements in quantum algorithms for these problems are taking place in the literature. In addition, the risk to cybersecurity can be well-managed by the migration to new, quantum-safe cryptographic protocols, which we survey and discuss. Given the above, we conclude there is a credible expectation that quantum computers will be capable of performing computations which are economically-impactful before they will be capable of performing ones which are cryptographically-relevant. |
| title | Assessing the Benefits and Risks of Quantum Computers |
| topic | Quantum Physics Physics and Society |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.16317 |