A mathematical theory of power
Fuente:
arXiv
Salvato in:
| Autore principale: | |
|---|---|
| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2024
|
| Soggetti: | |
| Accesso online: | |
| Tags: |
Aggiungi Tag
Nessun Tag, puoi essere il primo ad aggiungerne!!
|
| _version_ | 1866911766897754112 |
|---|---|
| author | De Luca, Daniele |
| author_facet | De Luca, Daniele |
| contents | This paper proposes a new approach to power in Game Theory. Cooperation and conflict are simulated with a mechanism of payoff alteration, called F-game. Using convex combinations of preferences, an F-game can measure players' attitude to cooperate. We can then define actual and potential power as special relations between different states of the system. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2401_16406 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | A mathematical theory of power De Luca, Daniele Theoretical Economics 91A40 This paper proposes a new approach to power in Game Theory. Cooperation and conflict are simulated with a mechanism of payoff alteration, called F-game. Using convex combinations of preferences, an F-game can measure players' attitude to cooperate. We can then define actual and potential power as special relations between different states of the system. |
| title | A mathematical theory of power |
| topic | Theoretical Economics 91A40 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.16406 |