Producers Equilibria and Dynamics in Engagement-Driven Recommender Systems
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2024
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| _version_ | 1866910835818889216 |
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| author | Acharya, Krishna Vangala, Varun Wang, Jingyan Ziani, Juba |
| author_facet | Acharya, Krishna Vangala, Varun Wang, Jingyan Ziani, Juba |
| contents | Online platforms such as YouTube, Instagram heavily rely on recommender systems to decide what content to present to users. Producers, in turn, often create content that is likely to be recommended to users and have users engage with it. To do so, producers try to align their content with the preferences of their targeted user base. In this work, we explore the equilibrium behavior of producers who are interested in maximizing user engagement. We study two variants of the content-serving rule for the platform's recommender system, and provide a structural characterization of producer behavior at equilibrium: namely, each producer chooses to focus on a single embedded feature. We further show that specialization, defined as different producers optimizing for distinct types of content, naturally emerges from the competition among producers trying to maximize user engagement. We provide a heuristic for computing equilibria of our engagement game, and evaluate it experimentally. We highlight i) the performance and convergence of our heuristic, ii) the degree of producer specialization, and iii) the impact of the content-serving rule on producer and user utilities at equilibrium and provide guidance on how to set the content-serving rule. |
| format | Preprint |
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arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2401_16641 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Producers Equilibria and Dynamics in Engagement-Driven Recommender Systems Acharya, Krishna Vangala, Varun Wang, Jingyan Ziani, Juba Computer Science and Game Theory Online platforms such as YouTube, Instagram heavily rely on recommender systems to decide what content to present to users. Producers, in turn, often create content that is likely to be recommended to users and have users engage with it. To do so, producers try to align their content with the preferences of their targeted user base. In this work, we explore the equilibrium behavior of producers who are interested in maximizing user engagement. We study two variants of the content-serving rule for the platform's recommender system, and provide a structural characterization of producer behavior at equilibrium: namely, each producer chooses to focus on a single embedded feature. We further show that specialization, defined as different producers optimizing for distinct types of content, naturally emerges from the competition among producers trying to maximize user engagement. We provide a heuristic for computing equilibria of our engagement game, and evaluate it experimentally. We highlight i) the performance and convergence of our heuristic, ii) the degree of producer specialization, and iii) the impact of the content-serving rule on producer and user utilities at equilibrium and provide guidance on how to set the content-serving rule. |
| title | Producers Equilibria and Dynamics in Engagement-Driven Recommender Systems |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.16641 |