On egalitarian values for cooperative games with level structures

Fuente: arXiv
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Autores principales: Alonso-Meijide, J. M., Costa, J., García-Jurado, I., Gonçalves-Dosantos, J. C.
Formato: Preprint
Publicado: 2024
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author Alonso-Meijide, J. M.
Costa, J.
García-Jurado, I.
Gonçalves-Dosantos, J. C.
author_facet Alonso-Meijide, J. M.
Costa, J.
García-Jurado, I.
Gonçalves-Dosantos, J. C.
contents In this paper we extend the equal division and the equal surplus division values for transferable utility cooperative games to the more general setup of transferable utility cooperative games with level structures. In the case of the equal surplus division value we propose three possible extensions, one of which has already been described in the literature. We provide axiomatic characterizations of the values considered, apply them to a particular cost sharing problem and compare them in the framework of such an application.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2401_16938
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle On egalitarian values for cooperative games with level structures
Alonso-Meijide, J. M.
Costa, J.
García-Jurado, I.
Gonçalves-Dosantos, J. C.
Computer Science and Game Theory
In this paper we extend the equal division and the equal surplus division values for transferable utility cooperative games to the more general setup of transferable utility cooperative games with level structures. In the case of the equal surplus division value we propose three possible extensions, one of which has already been described in the literature. We provide axiomatic characterizations of the values considered, apply them to a particular cost sharing problem and compare them in the framework of such an application.
title On egalitarian values for cooperative games with level structures
topic Computer Science and Game Theory
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.16938