Fairness by design in shared-energy allocation problems
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arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866910583325982720 |
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| author | Fornier, Zoé Leclère, Vincent Pinson, Pierre |
| author_facet | Fornier, Zoé Leclère, Vincent Pinson, Pierre |
| contents | This paper studies how to aggregate prosumers (or large consumers) and their collective decisions in electricity markets, with a focus on fairness. Fairness is essential for prosumers to participate in aggregation schemes. Some prosumers may not be able to access the energy market directly, even though it would be beneficial for them. Therefore, new companies offer to aggregate them and promise to treat them fairly. This leads to a fair resource allocation problem.
We propose to use acceptability constraints to guarantee that each prosumer gains from the aggregation. Moreover, we aim to distribute the costs and benefits fairly, taking into account the multi-period and uncertain nature of the problem. Rather than using financial mechanisms to adjust for fairness issues, we focus on various objectives and constraints, within decision problems, that achieve fairness by design. We start from a simple single-period and deterministic model, and then generalize it to a dynamic and stochastic setting using, e.g., stochastic dominance constraints. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2402_00471 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Fairness by design in shared-energy allocation problems Fornier, Zoé Leclère, Vincent Pinson, Pierre Optimization and Control This paper studies how to aggregate prosumers (or large consumers) and their collective decisions in electricity markets, with a focus on fairness. Fairness is essential for prosumers to participate in aggregation schemes. Some prosumers may not be able to access the energy market directly, even though it would be beneficial for them. Therefore, new companies offer to aggregate them and promise to treat them fairly. This leads to a fair resource allocation problem. We propose to use acceptability constraints to guarantee that each prosumer gains from the aggregation. Moreover, we aim to distribute the costs and benefits fairly, taking into account the multi-period and uncertain nature of the problem. Rather than using financial mechanisms to adjust for fairness issues, we focus on various objectives and constraints, within decision problems, that achieve fairness by design. We start from a simple single-period and deterministic model, and then generalize it to a dynamic and stochastic setting using, e.g., stochastic dominance constraints. |
| title | Fairness by design in shared-energy allocation problems |
| topic | Optimization and Control |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.00471 |