Physical Layer Location Privacy in SIMO Communication Using Fake Path Injection

Fuente: arXiv
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Auteurs principaux: Tran, Trong Duy, Da Costa, Maxime Ferreira, Nguyen, Linh Trung
Format: Preprint
Publié: 2024
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author Tran, Trong Duy
Da Costa, Maxime Ferreira
Nguyen, Linh Trung
author_facet Tran, Trong Duy
Da Costa, Maxime Ferreira
Nguyen, Linh Trung
contents Fake path injection is an emerging paradigm for inducing privacy over wireless networks. In this paper, fake paths are injected by the transmitters into a single-input multiple-output (SIMO) communication channel to obscure their physical location from an eavesdropper. The case where the receiver (Bob) and the eavesdropper (Eve) use a linear uniform array to locate the transmitter's (Alice) position is considered. A novel statistical privacy metric is defined as the ratio between the smallest (resp. largest) eigenvalues of Eve's (resp. Bob's) Cramér-Rao lower bound (CRB) on the SIMO channel parameters to assess the privacy enhancements. Leveraging the spectral properties of generalized Vandermonde matrices, bounds on the privacy margin of the proposed scheme are derived. Specifically, it is shown that the privacy margin increases quadratically in the inverse of the angular separation between the true and the fake paths under Eve's perspective. Numerical simulations validate the theoretical findings on CRBs and showcase the approach's benefit in terms of bit error rates achievable by Bob and Eve.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2402_01198
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Physical Layer Location Privacy in SIMO Communication Using Fake Path Injection
Tran, Trong Duy
Da Costa, Maxime Ferreira
Nguyen, Linh Trung
Information Theory
Signal Processing
Fake path injection is an emerging paradigm for inducing privacy over wireless networks. In this paper, fake paths are injected by the transmitters into a single-input multiple-output (SIMO) communication channel to obscure their physical location from an eavesdropper. The case where the receiver (Bob) and the eavesdropper (Eve) use a linear uniform array to locate the transmitter's (Alice) position is considered. A novel statistical privacy metric is defined as the ratio between the smallest (resp. largest) eigenvalues of Eve's (resp. Bob's) Cramér-Rao lower bound (CRB) on the SIMO channel parameters to assess the privacy enhancements. Leveraging the spectral properties of generalized Vandermonde matrices, bounds on the privacy margin of the proposed scheme are derived. Specifically, it is shown that the privacy margin increases quadratically in the inverse of the angular separation between the true and the fake paths under Eve's perspective. Numerical simulations validate the theoretical findings on CRBs and showcase the approach's benefit in terms of bit error rates achievable by Bob and Eve.
title Physical Layer Location Privacy in SIMO Communication Using Fake Path Injection
topic Information Theory
Signal Processing
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.01198