Fundamental Challenges in Cybersecurity and a Philosophy of Vulnerability-Guided Hardening
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autore principale: | |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866917766851723264 |
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| author | Böhme, Marcel |
| author_facet | Böhme, Marcel |
| contents | Research in cybersecurity may seem reactive, specific, ephemeral, and indeed ineffective. Despite decades of innovation in defense, even the most critical software systems turn out to be vulnerable to attacks. Time and again. Offense and defense forever on repeat. Even provable security, meant to provide an indubitable guarantee of security, does not stop attackers from finding security flaws. As we reflect on our achievements, we are left wondering: Can security be solved once and for all?
In this paper, we take a philosophical perspective and develop the first theory of cybersecurity that explains what precisely and *fundamentally* prevents us from making reliable statements about the security of a software system. We substantiate each argument by demonstrating how the corresponding challenge is routinely exploited to attack a system despite credible assurances about the absence of security flaws. To make meaningful progress in the presence of these challenges, we introduce a philosophy of cybersecurity. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2402_01944 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Fundamental Challenges in Cybersecurity and a Philosophy of Vulnerability-Guided Hardening Böhme, Marcel Cryptography and Security Software Engineering Research in cybersecurity may seem reactive, specific, ephemeral, and indeed ineffective. Despite decades of innovation in defense, even the most critical software systems turn out to be vulnerable to attacks. Time and again. Offense and defense forever on repeat. Even provable security, meant to provide an indubitable guarantee of security, does not stop attackers from finding security flaws. As we reflect on our achievements, we are left wondering: Can security be solved once and for all? In this paper, we take a philosophical perspective and develop the first theory of cybersecurity that explains what precisely and *fundamentally* prevents us from making reliable statements about the security of a software system. We substantiate each argument by demonstrating how the corresponding challenge is routinely exploited to attack a system despite credible assurances about the absence of security flaws. To make meaningful progress in the presence of these challenges, we introduce a philosophy of cybersecurity. |
| title | Fundamental Challenges in Cybersecurity and a Philosophy of Vulnerability-Guided Hardening |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Software Engineering |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.01944 |