Towards Principled Risk Scores for Space Cyber Risk Management

Fuente: arXiv
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Autores principales: Ear, Ekzhin, Bailey, Brandon, Xu, Shouhuai
Formato: Preprint
Publicado: 2024
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author Ear, Ekzhin
Bailey, Brandon
Xu, Shouhuai
author_facet Ear, Ekzhin
Bailey, Brandon
Xu, Shouhuai
contents Space is an emerging domain critical to humankind. Correspondingly, space cybersecurity is an emerging field with much research to be done. To help space cybersecurity practitioners better manage cyber risks, The Aerospace Corporation proposed Notional Risk Scores (NRS) within their Space Attack Research and Tactic Analysis (SPARTA) framework, which can be applied to quantify the cyber risks associated with space infrastructures and systems. While intended for adoption by practitioners, NRS has not been analyzed with real-world scenarios, putting its effectiveness into question. In this paper we analyze NRS via a real-world cyber attack scenario against a satellite, and characterize the strengths, weaknesses, and applicability of NRS. The characterization prompts us to propose a set of desired properties to guide the design of future NRS. As a first step along this direction, we further propose a formalism to serve as a baseline for designing future NRS with those desired properties.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2402_02635
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Towards Principled Risk Scores for Space Cyber Risk Management
Ear, Ekzhin
Bailey, Brandon
Xu, Shouhuai
Cryptography and Security
Space is an emerging domain critical to humankind. Correspondingly, space cybersecurity is an emerging field with much research to be done. To help space cybersecurity practitioners better manage cyber risks, The Aerospace Corporation proposed Notional Risk Scores (NRS) within their Space Attack Research and Tactic Analysis (SPARTA) framework, which can be applied to quantify the cyber risks associated with space infrastructures and systems. While intended for adoption by practitioners, NRS has not been analyzed with real-world scenarios, putting its effectiveness into question. In this paper we analyze NRS via a real-world cyber attack scenario against a satellite, and characterize the strengths, weaknesses, and applicability of NRS. The characterization prompts us to propose a set of desired properties to guide the design of future NRS. As a first step along this direction, we further propose a formalism to serve as a baseline for designing future NRS with those desired properties.
title Towards Principled Risk Scores for Space Cyber Risk Management
topic Cryptography and Security
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.02635