A Unified Framework of Multi-Stage Multi-Winner Voting: An Axiomatic Exploration
Fuente:
arXiv
Enregistré dans:
| Auteurs principaux: | , , , , , , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2024
|
| Sujets: | |
| Accès en ligne: | |
| Tags: |
Ajouter un tag
Pas de tags, Soyez le premier à ajouter un tag!
|
| _version_ | 1866909093149540352 |
|---|---|
| author | Gong, Shengjie Huang, Lingxiao Huang, Shuangping Wang, Yuyi Wang, Zhiqi Xiao, Tao Yan, Xiang Yang, Chunxue |
| author_facet | Gong, Shengjie Huang, Lingxiao Huang, Shuangping Wang, Yuyi Wang, Zhiqi Xiao, Tao Yan, Xiang Yang, Chunxue |
| contents | Multi-winner voting plays a crucial role in selecting representative committees based on voter preferences. Previous research has predominantly focused on single-stage voting rules, which are susceptible to manipulation during preference collection. In order to mitigate manipulation and increase the cost associated with it, we propose the introduction of multiple stages in the voting procedure, leading to the development of a unified framework of multi-stage multi-winner voting rules. To shed light on this framework of voting methods, we conduct an axiomatic study, establishing provable conditions for achieving desired axioms within our model. Our theoretical findings can serve as a guide for the selection of appropriate multi-stage multi-winner voting rules. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2402_02673 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | A Unified Framework of Multi-Stage Multi-Winner Voting: An Axiomatic Exploration Gong, Shengjie Huang, Lingxiao Huang, Shuangping Wang, Yuyi Wang, Zhiqi Xiao, Tao Yan, Xiang Yang, Chunxue Computer Science and Game Theory Multi-winner voting plays a crucial role in selecting representative committees based on voter preferences. Previous research has predominantly focused on single-stage voting rules, which are susceptible to manipulation during preference collection. In order to mitigate manipulation and increase the cost associated with it, we propose the introduction of multiple stages in the voting procedure, leading to the development of a unified framework of multi-stage multi-winner voting rules. To shed light on this framework of voting methods, we conduct an axiomatic study, establishing provable conditions for achieving desired axioms within our model. Our theoretical findings can serve as a guide for the selection of appropriate multi-stage multi-winner voting rules. |
| title | A Unified Framework of Multi-Stage Multi-Winner Voting: An Axiomatic Exploration |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.02673 |