Extending RAIM with a Gaussian Mixture of Opportunistic Information
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arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866909094390005760 |
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| author | Liu, Wenjie Papadimitratos, Panos |
| author_facet | Liu, Wenjie Papadimitratos, Panos |
| contents | GNSS are indispensable for various applications, but they are vulnerable to spoofing attacks. The original receiver autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM) was not designed for securing GNSS. In this context, RAIM was extended with wireless signals, termed signals of opportunity (SOPs), or onboard sensors, typically assumed benign. However, attackers might also manipulate wireless networks, raising the need for a solution that considers untrustworthy SOPs. To address this, we extend RAIM by incorporating all opportunistic information, i.e., measurements from terrestrial infrastructures and onboard sensors, culminating in one function for robust GNSS spoofing detection. The objective is to assess the likelihood of GNSS spoofing by analyzing locations derived from extended RAIM solutions, which include location solutions from GNSS pseudorange subsets and wireless signal subsets of untrusted networks. Our method comprises two pivotal components: subset generation and location fusion. Subsets of ranging information are created and processed through positioning algorithms, producing temporary locations. Onboard sensors provide speed, acceleration, and attitude data, aiding in location filtering based on motion constraints. The filtered locations, modeled with uncertainty, are fused into a composite likelihood function normalized for GNSS spoofing detection. Theoretical assessments of GNSS-only and multi-infrastructure scenarios under uncoordinated and coordinated attacks are conducted. The detection of these attacks is feasible when the number of benign subsets exceeds a specific threshold. A real-world dataset from the Kista area is used for experimental validation. Comparative analysis against baseline methods shows a significant improvement in detection accuracy achieved by our Gaussian Mixture RAIM approach. Moreover, we discuss leveraging RAIM results for plausible location recovery. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2402_03449 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Extending RAIM with a Gaussian Mixture of Opportunistic Information Liu, Wenjie Papadimitratos, Panos Cryptography and Security Signal Processing GNSS are indispensable for various applications, but they are vulnerable to spoofing attacks. The original receiver autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM) was not designed for securing GNSS. In this context, RAIM was extended with wireless signals, termed signals of opportunity (SOPs), or onboard sensors, typically assumed benign. However, attackers might also manipulate wireless networks, raising the need for a solution that considers untrustworthy SOPs. To address this, we extend RAIM by incorporating all opportunistic information, i.e., measurements from terrestrial infrastructures and onboard sensors, culminating in one function for robust GNSS spoofing detection. The objective is to assess the likelihood of GNSS spoofing by analyzing locations derived from extended RAIM solutions, which include location solutions from GNSS pseudorange subsets and wireless signal subsets of untrusted networks. Our method comprises two pivotal components: subset generation and location fusion. Subsets of ranging information are created and processed through positioning algorithms, producing temporary locations. Onboard sensors provide speed, acceleration, and attitude data, aiding in location filtering based on motion constraints. The filtered locations, modeled with uncertainty, are fused into a composite likelihood function normalized for GNSS spoofing detection. Theoretical assessments of GNSS-only and multi-infrastructure scenarios under uncoordinated and coordinated attacks are conducted. The detection of these attacks is feasible when the number of benign subsets exceeds a specific threshold. A real-world dataset from the Kista area is used for experimental validation. Comparative analysis against baseline methods shows a significant improvement in detection accuracy achieved by our Gaussian Mixture RAIM approach. Moreover, we discuss leveraging RAIM results for plausible location recovery. |
| title | Extending RAIM with a Gaussian Mixture of Opportunistic Information |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Signal Processing |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.03449 |