Merkle Trees in Blockchain: A Study of Collision Probability and Security Implications
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arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , , , , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866914766406025216 |
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| author | Kuznetsov, Oleksandr Rusnak, Alex Yezhov, Anton Kuznetsova, Kateryna Kanonik, Dzianis Domin, Oleksandr |
| author_facet | Kuznetsov, Oleksandr Rusnak, Alex Yezhov, Anton Kuznetsova, Kateryna Kanonik, Dzianis Domin, Oleksandr |
| contents | In the rapidly evolving landscape of blockchain technology, ensuring the integrity and security of data is paramount. This study delves into the security aspects of Merkle Trees, a fundamental component in blockchain architectures, such as Ethereum. We critically examine the susceptibility of Merkle Trees to hash collisions, a potential vulnerability that poses significant risks to data security within blockchain systems. Despite their widespread application, the collision resistance of Merkle Trees and their robustness against preimage attacks have not been thoroughly investigated, leading to a notable gap in the comprehensive understanding of blockchain security mechanisms. Our research endeavors to bridge this gap through a meticulous blend of theoretical analysis and empirical validation. We scrutinize the probability of root collisions in Merkle Trees, considering various factors such as hash length and path length within the tree. Our findings reveal a direct correlation between the increase in path length and the heightened probability of root collisions, thereby underscoring potential security vulnerabilities. Conversely, we observe that an increase in hash length significantly reduces the likelihood of collisions, highlighting its critical role in fortifying security. The insights garnered from our research offer valuable guidance for blockchain developers and researchers, aiming to bolster the security and operational efficacy of blockchain-based systems. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2402_04367 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Merkle Trees in Blockchain: A Study of Collision Probability and Security Implications Kuznetsov, Oleksandr Rusnak, Alex Yezhov, Anton Kuznetsova, Kateryna Kanonik, Dzianis Domin, Oleksandr Cryptography and Security In the rapidly evolving landscape of blockchain technology, ensuring the integrity and security of data is paramount. This study delves into the security aspects of Merkle Trees, a fundamental component in blockchain architectures, such as Ethereum. We critically examine the susceptibility of Merkle Trees to hash collisions, a potential vulnerability that poses significant risks to data security within blockchain systems. Despite their widespread application, the collision resistance of Merkle Trees and their robustness against preimage attacks have not been thoroughly investigated, leading to a notable gap in the comprehensive understanding of blockchain security mechanisms. Our research endeavors to bridge this gap through a meticulous blend of theoretical analysis and empirical validation. We scrutinize the probability of root collisions in Merkle Trees, considering various factors such as hash length and path length within the tree. Our findings reveal a direct correlation between the increase in path length and the heightened probability of root collisions, thereby underscoring potential security vulnerabilities. Conversely, we observe that an increase in hash length significantly reduces the likelihood of collisions, highlighting its critical role in fortifying security. The insights garnered from our research offer valuable guidance for blockchain developers and researchers, aiming to bolster the security and operational efficacy of blockchain-based systems. |
| title | Merkle Trees in Blockchain: A Study of Collision Probability and Security Implications |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.04367 |