On the Outcome Equivalence of Extensive-Form and Behavioral Correlated Equilibria
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866911773432479744 |
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| author | Zhang, Brian Hu Sandholm, Tuomas |
| author_facet | Zhang, Brian Hu Sandholm, Tuomas |
| contents | We investigate two notions of correlated equilibrium for extensive-form games: extensive-form correlated equilibrium (EFCE) and behavioral correlated equilibrium (BCE). We show that the two are outcome-equivalent, in the sense that every outcome distribution achievable under one notion is achievable under the other. Our result implies, to our knowledge, the first polynomial-time algorithm for computing a BCE. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2402_05245 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | On the Outcome Equivalence of Extensive-Form and Behavioral Correlated Equilibria Zhang, Brian Hu Sandholm, Tuomas Computer Science and Game Theory We investigate two notions of correlated equilibrium for extensive-form games: extensive-form correlated equilibrium (EFCE) and behavioral correlated equilibrium (BCE). We show that the two are outcome-equivalent, in the sense that every outcome distribution achievable under one notion is achievable under the other. Our result implies, to our knowledge, the first polynomial-time algorithm for computing a BCE. |
| title | On the Outcome Equivalence of Extensive-Form and Behavioral Correlated Equilibria |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.05245 |