FedMIA: An Effective Membership Inference Attack Exploiting "All for One" Principle in Federated Learning

Fuente: arXiv
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Autori principali: Zhu, Gongxi, Li, Donghao, Gu, Hanlin, Yao, Yuan, Fan, Lixin, Han, Yuxing
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2024
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author Zhu, Gongxi
Li, Donghao
Gu, Hanlin
Yao, Yuan
Fan, Lixin
Han, Yuxing
author_facet Zhu, Gongxi
Li, Donghao
Gu, Hanlin
Yao, Yuan
Fan, Lixin
Han, Yuxing
contents Federated Learning (FL) is a promising approach for training machine learning models on decentralized data while preserving privacy. However, privacy risks, particularly Membership Inference Attacks (MIAs), which aim to determine whether a specific data point belongs to a target client's training set, remain a significant concern. Existing methods for implementing MIAs in FL primarily analyze updates from the target client, focusing on metrics such as loss, gradient norm, and gradient difference. However, these methods fail to leverage updates from non-target clients, potentially underutilizing available information. In this paper, we first formulate a one-tailed likelihood-ratio hypothesis test based on the likelihood of updates from non-target clients. Building upon this formulation, we introduce a three-step Membership Inference Attack (MIA) method, called FedMIA, which follows the "all for one"--leveraging updates from all clients across multiple communication rounds to enhance MIA effectiveness. Both theoretical analysis and extensive experimental results demonstrate that FedMIA outperforms existing MIAs in both classification and generative tasks. Additionally, it can be integrated as an extension to existing methods and is robust against various defense strategies, Non-IID data, and different federated structures. Our code is available in https://github.com/Liar-Mask/FedMIA.
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id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2402_06289
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle FedMIA: An Effective Membership Inference Attack Exploiting "All for One" Principle in Federated Learning
Zhu, Gongxi
Li, Donghao
Gu, Hanlin
Yao, Yuan
Fan, Lixin
Han, Yuxing
Machine Learning
Cryptography and Security
Federated Learning (FL) is a promising approach for training machine learning models on decentralized data while preserving privacy. However, privacy risks, particularly Membership Inference Attacks (MIAs), which aim to determine whether a specific data point belongs to a target client's training set, remain a significant concern. Existing methods for implementing MIAs in FL primarily analyze updates from the target client, focusing on metrics such as loss, gradient norm, and gradient difference. However, these methods fail to leverage updates from non-target clients, potentially underutilizing available information. In this paper, we first formulate a one-tailed likelihood-ratio hypothesis test based on the likelihood of updates from non-target clients. Building upon this formulation, we introduce a three-step Membership Inference Attack (MIA) method, called FedMIA, which follows the "all for one"--leveraging updates from all clients across multiple communication rounds to enhance MIA effectiveness. Both theoretical analysis and extensive experimental results demonstrate that FedMIA outperforms existing MIAs in both classification and generative tasks. Additionally, it can be integrated as an extension to existing methods and is robust against various defense strategies, Non-IID data, and different federated structures. Our code is available in https://github.com/Liar-Mask/FedMIA.
title FedMIA: An Effective Membership Inference Attack Exploiting "All for One" Principle in Federated Learning
topic Machine Learning
Cryptography and Security
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.06289