Value-based Resource Matching with Fairness Criteria: Application to Agricultural Water Trading

Fuente: arXiv
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Hauptverfasser: Adiga, Abhijin, Trabelsi, Yohai, Ferdousi, Tanvir, Marathe, Madhav, Ravi, S. S., Swarup, Samarth, Vullikanti, Anil Kumar, Wilson, Mandy L., Kraus, Sarit, Basu, Reetwika, Savalkar, Supriya, Yourek, Matthew, Brady, Michael, Rajagopalan, Kirti, Yoder, Jonathan
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2024
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author Adiga, Abhijin
Trabelsi, Yohai
Ferdousi, Tanvir
Marathe, Madhav
Ravi, S. S.
Swarup, Samarth
Vullikanti, Anil Kumar
Wilson, Mandy L.
Kraus, Sarit
Basu, Reetwika
Savalkar, Supriya
Yourek, Matthew
Brady, Michael
Rajagopalan, Kirti
Yoder, Jonathan
author_facet Adiga, Abhijin
Trabelsi, Yohai
Ferdousi, Tanvir
Marathe, Madhav
Ravi, S. S.
Swarup, Samarth
Vullikanti, Anil Kumar
Wilson, Mandy L.
Kraus, Sarit
Basu, Reetwika
Savalkar, Supriya
Yourek, Matthew
Brady, Michael
Rajagopalan, Kirti
Yoder, Jonathan
contents Optimal allocation of agricultural water in the event of droughts is an important global problem. In addressing this problem, many aspects, including the welfare of farmers, the economy, and the environment, must be considered. Under this backdrop, our work focuses on several resource-matching problems accounting for agents with multi-crop portfolios, geographic constraints, and fairness. First, we address a matching problem where the goal is to maximize a welfare function in two-sided markets where buyers' requirements and sellers' supplies are represented by value functions that assign prices (or costs) to specified volumes of water. For the setting where the value functions satisfy certain monotonicity properties, we present an efficient algorithm that maximizes a social welfare function. When there are minimum water requirement constraints, we present a randomized algorithm which ensures that the constraints are satisfied in expectation. For a single seller--multiple buyers setting with fairness constraints, we design an efficient algorithm that maximizes the minimum level of satisfaction of any buyer. We also present computational complexity results that highlight the limits on the generalizability of our results. We evaluate the algorithms developed in our work with experiments on both real-world and synthetic data sets with respect to drought severity, value functions, and seniority of agents.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2402_06576
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Value-based Resource Matching with Fairness Criteria: Application to Agricultural Water Trading
Adiga, Abhijin
Trabelsi, Yohai
Ferdousi, Tanvir
Marathe, Madhav
Ravi, S. S.
Swarup, Samarth
Vullikanti, Anil Kumar
Wilson, Mandy L.
Kraus, Sarit
Basu, Reetwika
Savalkar, Supriya
Yourek, Matthew
Brady, Michael
Rajagopalan, Kirti
Yoder, Jonathan
Data Structures and Algorithms
Multiagent Systems
Optimal allocation of agricultural water in the event of droughts is an important global problem. In addressing this problem, many aspects, including the welfare of farmers, the economy, and the environment, must be considered. Under this backdrop, our work focuses on several resource-matching problems accounting for agents with multi-crop portfolios, geographic constraints, and fairness. First, we address a matching problem where the goal is to maximize a welfare function in two-sided markets where buyers' requirements and sellers' supplies are represented by value functions that assign prices (or costs) to specified volumes of water. For the setting where the value functions satisfy certain monotonicity properties, we present an efficient algorithm that maximizes a social welfare function. When there are minimum water requirement constraints, we present a randomized algorithm which ensures that the constraints are satisfied in expectation. For a single seller--multiple buyers setting with fairness constraints, we design an efficient algorithm that maximizes the minimum level of satisfaction of any buyer. We also present computational complexity results that highlight the limits on the generalizability of our results. We evaluate the algorithms developed in our work with experiments on both real-world and synthetic data sets with respect to drought severity, value functions, and seniority of agents.
title Value-based Resource Matching with Fairness Criteria: Application to Agricultural Water Trading
topic Data Structures and Algorithms
Multiagent Systems
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.06576