They were robbed! Scoring by the middlemost to attenuate biased judging in boxing
Fuente:
arXiv
Guardado en:
| Autores principales: | , |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2024
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | |
| Etiquetas: |
Agregar Etiqueta
Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!
|
| _version_ | 1866913405919559680 |
|---|---|
| author | Baumann, Stuart Singleton, Carl |
| author_facet | Baumann, Stuart Singleton, Carl |
| contents | Boxing has a long-standing problem with biased judging, impacting both professional and Olympic bouts. "Robberies", where boxers are widely seen as being denied rightful victories, threaten to drive fans and athletes away from the sport. To tackle this problem, we propose a minimalist adjustment in how boxing is scored: the winner would be decided by the majority of round-by-round victories according to the judges, rather than relying on the judges' overall bout scores. This approach, rooted in social choice theory and utilising majority rule and middlemost aggregation functions, creates a coordination problem for partisan judges and attenuates their influence. Our model analysis and simulations demonstrate the potential to significantly decrease the likelihood of a partisan judge swaying the result of a bout. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2402_06594 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | They were robbed! Scoring by the middlemost to attenuate biased judging in boxing Baumann, Stuart Singleton, Carl General Economics Economics Boxing has a long-standing problem with biased judging, impacting both professional and Olympic bouts. "Robberies", where boxers are widely seen as being denied rightful victories, threaten to drive fans and athletes away from the sport. To tackle this problem, we propose a minimalist adjustment in how boxing is scored: the winner would be decided by the majority of round-by-round victories according to the judges, rather than relying on the judges' overall bout scores. This approach, rooted in social choice theory and utilising majority rule and middlemost aggregation functions, creates a coordination problem for partisan judges and attenuates their influence. Our model analysis and simulations demonstrate the potential to significantly decrease the likelihood of a partisan judge swaying the result of a bout. |
| title | They were robbed! Scoring by the middlemost to attenuate biased judging in boxing |
| topic | General Economics Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.06594 |