Perfect Bayesian Persuasion
Fuente:
arXiv
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2024
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1866911774850154496 |
|---|---|
| author | Lipnowski, Elliot Ravid, Doron Shishkin, Denis |
| author_facet | Lipnowski, Elliot Ravid, Doron Shishkin, Denis |
| contents | A sender commits to an experiment to persuade a receiver. Accounting for the sender's experiment-choice incentives, and not presupposing a receiver tie-breaking rule when indifferent, we characterize when the sender's equilibrium payoff is unique and so coincides with her "Bayesian persuasion" value. A sufficient condition in finite models is that every action which is receiver-optimal at some belief is uniquely optimal at some other belief -- a generic property. We similarly show the equilibrium sender payoff is typically unique in ordered models. In an extension, we show uniqueness generates robustness to imperfect sender commitment. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2402_06765 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Perfect Bayesian Persuasion Lipnowski, Elliot Ravid, Doron Shishkin, Denis Theoretical Economics A sender commits to an experiment to persuade a receiver. Accounting for the sender's experiment-choice incentives, and not presupposing a receiver tie-breaking rule when indifferent, we characterize when the sender's equilibrium payoff is unique and so coincides with her "Bayesian persuasion" value. A sufficient condition in finite models is that every action which is receiver-optimal at some belief is uniquely optimal at some other belief -- a generic property. We similarly show the equilibrium sender payoff is typically unique in ordered models. In an extension, we show uniqueness generates robustness to imperfect sender commitment. |
| title | Perfect Bayesian Persuasion |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.06765 |