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Perfect Bayesian Persuasion

Fuente: arXiv

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales:	Lipnowski, Elliot, Ravid, Doron, Shishkin, Denis
Formato:	Preprint
Publicado:	2024
Materias:	Theoretical Economics
Acceso en línea:	Acceder al recurso
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

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