Fairness Auditing with Multi-Agent Collaboration

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: de Vos, Martijn, Dhasade, Akash, Bourrée, Jade Garcia, Kermarrec, Anne-Marie, Merrer, Erwan Le, Rottembourg, Benoit, Tredan, Gilles
Format: Preprint
Published: 2024
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author de Vos, Martijn
Dhasade, Akash
Bourrée, Jade Garcia
Kermarrec, Anne-Marie
Merrer, Erwan Le
Rottembourg, Benoit
Tredan, Gilles
author_facet de Vos, Martijn
Dhasade, Akash
Bourrée, Jade Garcia
Kermarrec, Anne-Marie
Merrer, Erwan Le
Rottembourg, Benoit
Tredan, Gilles
contents Existing work in fairness auditing assumes that each audit is performed independently. In this paper, we consider multiple agents working together, each auditing the same platform for different tasks. Agents have two levers: their collaboration strategy, with or without coordination beforehand, and their strategy for sampling appropriate data points. We theoretically compare the interplay of these levers. Our main findings are that (i) collaboration is generally beneficial for accurate audits, (ii) basic sampling methods often prove to be effective, and (iii) counter-intuitively, extensive coordination on queries often deteriorates audits accuracy as the number of agents increases. Experiments on three large datasets confirm our theoretical results. Our findings motivate collaboration during fairness audits of platforms that use ML models for decision-making.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2402_08522
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Fairness Auditing with Multi-Agent Collaboration
de Vos, Martijn
Dhasade, Akash
Bourrée, Jade Garcia
Kermarrec, Anne-Marie
Merrer, Erwan Le
Rottembourg, Benoit
Tredan, Gilles
Machine Learning
Existing work in fairness auditing assumes that each audit is performed independently. In this paper, we consider multiple agents working together, each auditing the same platform for different tasks. Agents have two levers: their collaboration strategy, with or without coordination beforehand, and their strategy for sampling appropriate data points. We theoretically compare the interplay of these levers. Our main findings are that (i) collaboration is generally beneficial for accurate audits, (ii) basic sampling methods often prove to be effective, and (iii) counter-intuitively, extensive coordination on queries often deteriorates audits accuracy as the number of agents increases. Experiments on three large datasets confirm our theoretical results. Our findings motivate collaboration during fairness audits of platforms that use ML models for decision-making.
title Fairness Auditing with Multi-Agent Collaboration
topic Machine Learning
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.08522