Continuous-Time Best-Response and Related Dynamics in Tullock Contests with Convex Costs
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arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866913568698400768 |
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| author | Elkind, Edith Ghosh, Abheek Goldberg, Paul W. |
| author_facet | Elkind, Edith Ghosh, Abheek Goldberg, Paul W. |
| contents | Tullock contests model real-life scenarios that range from competition among proof-of-work blockchain miners to rent-seeking and lobbying activities. We show that continuous-time best-response dynamics in Tullock contests with convex costs converges to the unique equilibrium using Lyapunov-style arguments. We then use this result to provide an algorithm for computing an approximate equilibrium. We also establish convergence of related discrete-time dynamics, e.g., when the agents best-respond to the empirical average action of other agents. These results indicate that the equilibrium is a reliable predictor of the agents' behavior in these games. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2402_08541 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Continuous-Time Best-Response and Related Dynamics in Tullock Contests with Convex Costs Elkind, Edith Ghosh, Abheek Goldberg, Paul W. Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics Tullock contests model real-life scenarios that range from competition among proof-of-work blockchain miners to rent-seeking and lobbying activities. We show that continuous-time best-response dynamics in Tullock contests with convex costs converges to the unique equilibrium using Lyapunov-style arguments. We then use this result to provide an algorithm for computing an approximate equilibrium. We also establish convergence of related discrete-time dynamics, e.g., when the agents best-respond to the empirical average action of other agents. These results indicate that the equilibrium is a reliable predictor of the agents' behavior in these games. |
| title | Continuous-Time Best-Response and Related Dynamics in Tullock Contests with Convex Costs |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.08541 |