Equitable screening
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866915645781704704 |
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| author | Tokarski, Filip |
| author_facet | Tokarski, Filip |
| contents | A designer distributes goods while considering the perceived equity of the resulting allocation. Such concerns are modeled through an equity constraint requiring that equally deserving agents receive equal allocations. I ask what forms of screening are compatible with equity and show that while the designer cannot equitably screen with a single instrument (e.g., payments or ordeals), combining multiple instruments, which on their own favor different groups, allows her to screen while still producing an equitable allocation. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2402_08781 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Equitable screening Tokarski, Filip Theoretical Economics A designer distributes goods while considering the perceived equity of the resulting allocation. Such concerns are modeled through an equity constraint requiring that equally deserving agents receive equal allocations. I ask what forms of screening are compatible with equity and show that while the designer cannot equitably screen with a single instrument (e.g., payments or ordeals), combining multiple instruments, which on their own favor different groups, allows her to screen while still producing an equitable allocation. |
| title | Equitable screening |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.08781 |