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Main Authors: Lewis, Martha, Mitchell, Melanie
Format: Preprint
Published: 2024
Subjects:
Online Access:https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.08955
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author Lewis, Martha
Mitchell, Melanie
author_facet Lewis, Martha
Mitchell, Melanie
contents Large language models (LLMs) have performed well on several reasoning benchmarks, including ones that test analogical reasoning abilities. However, it has been debated whether they are actually performing humanlike abstract reasoning or instead employing less general processes that rely on similarity to what has been seen in their training data. Here we investigate the generality of analogy-making abilities previously claimed for LLMs (Webb, Holyoak, & Lu, 2023). We take one set of analogy problems used to evaluate LLMs and create a set of "counterfactual" variants-versions that test the same abstract reasoning abilities but that are likely dissimilar from any pre-training data. We test humans and three GPT models on both the original and counterfactual problems, and show that, while the performance of humans remains high for all the problems, the GPT models' performance declines sharply on the counterfactual set. This work provides evidence that, despite previously reported successes of LLMs on analogical reasoning, these models lack the robustness and generality of human analogy-making.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2402_08955
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Using Counterfactual Tasks to Evaluate the Generality of Analogical Reasoning in Large Language Models
Lewis, Martha
Mitchell, Melanie
Artificial Intelligence
Computation and Language
Large language models (LLMs) have performed well on several reasoning benchmarks, including ones that test analogical reasoning abilities. However, it has been debated whether they are actually performing humanlike abstract reasoning or instead employing less general processes that rely on similarity to what has been seen in their training data. Here we investigate the generality of analogy-making abilities previously claimed for LLMs (Webb, Holyoak, & Lu, 2023). We take one set of analogy problems used to evaluate LLMs and create a set of "counterfactual" variants-versions that test the same abstract reasoning abilities but that are likely dissimilar from any pre-training data. We test humans and three GPT models on both the original and counterfactual problems, and show that, while the performance of humans remains high for all the problems, the GPT models' performance declines sharply on the counterfactual set. This work provides evidence that, despite previously reported successes of LLMs on analogical reasoning, these models lack the robustness and generality of human analogy-making.
title Using Counterfactual Tasks to Evaluate the Generality of Analogical Reasoning in Large Language Models
topic Artificial Intelligence
Computation and Language
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.08955