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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2023
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.09413 |
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| _version_ | 1866914679622729728 |
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| author | Halpern, Joseph Y. |
| author_facet | Halpern, Joseph Y. |
| contents | A definition of what counts as an explanation of mathematical statement, and when one explanation is better than another, is given. Since all mathematical facts must be true in all causal models, and hence known by an agent, mathematical facts cannot be part of an explanation (under the standard notion of explanation). This problem is solved using impossible possible worlds. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2402_09413 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Mathematical Explanations Halpern, Joseph Y. Artificial Intelligence A definition of what counts as an explanation of mathematical statement, and when one explanation is better than another, is given. Since all mathematical facts must be true in all causal models, and hence known by an agent, mathematical facts cannot be part of an explanation (under the standard notion of explanation). This problem is solved using impossible possible worlds. |
| title | Mathematical Explanations |
| topic | Artificial Intelligence |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.09413 |