A game theoretic approach to lowering incentives to violate speed limits in Finland
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866909107165855744 |
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| author | Sutela, Mika Lindström, Nino |
| author_facet | Sutela, Mika Lindström, Nino |
| contents | We expand on earlier research on the topic by discussing an infinitely repeated game model with a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy profile (SPE) as a solution concept that diminishes incentives to violate speed limits in a carrot and stick fashion. In attempts to construct an SPE strategy profile, the initial state is chosen such that the drivers are playing a mixed strategy whereas the police is not enforcing with certainty. We also postulate a short period version of the repeated game with generalized stage game payoffs. For this game, we construct a multistage strategy profile that is a Nash equilibrium but not an SPE. Some solution candidates are excluded by showing that they do not satisfy a one shot deviation property that is a necessary condition for an SPE profile in a repeated game of perfect information. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2402_09556 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | A game theoretic approach to lowering incentives to violate speed limits in Finland Sutela, Mika Lindström, Nino General Economics Economics We expand on earlier research on the topic by discussing an infinitely repeated game model with a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy profile (SPE) as a solution concept that diminishes incentives to violate speed limits in a carrot and stick fashion. In attempts to construct an SPE strategy profile, the initial state is chosen such that the drivers are playing a mixed strategy whereas the police is not enforcing with certainty. We also postulate a short period version of the repeated game with generalized stage game payoffs. For this game, we construct a multistage strategy profile that is a Nash equilibrium but not an SPE. Some solution candidates are excluded by showing that they do not satisfy a one shot deviation property that is a necessary condition for an SPE profile in a repeated game of perfect information. |
| title | A game theoretic approach to lowering incentives to violate speed limits in Finland |
| topic | General Economics Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.09556 |