Misinformation Regulation in the Presence of Competition between Social Media Platforms (Extended Version)
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arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866914680148066304 |
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| author | Sasaki, So Langbort, Cédric |
| author_facet | Sasaki, So Langbort, Cédric |
| contents | Social media platforms have diverse content moderation policies, with many prominent actors hesitant to impose strict regulations. A key reason for this reluctance could be the competitive advantage that comes with lax regulation. A popular platform that starts enforcing content moderation rules may fear that it could lose users to less-regulated alternative platforms. Moreover, if users continue harmful activities on other platforms, regulation ends up being futile. This article examines the competitive aspect of content moderation by considering the motivations of all involved players (platformer, news source, and social media users), identifying the regulation policies sustained in equilibrium, and evaluating the information quality available on each platform. Applied to simple yet relevant social networks such as stochastic block models, our model reveals the conditions for a popular platform to enforce strict regulation without losing users. Effectiveness of regulation depends on the diffusive property of news posts, friend interaction qualities in social media, the sizes and cohesiveness of communities, and how much sympathizers appreciate surprising news from influencers. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2402_09639 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Misinformation Regulation in the Presence of Competition between Social Media Platforms (Extended Version) Sasaki, So Langbort, Cédric Computer Science and Game Theory Social and Information Networks Social media platforms have diverse content moderation policies, with many prominent actors hesitant to impose strict regulations. A key reason for this reluctance could be the competitive advantage that comes with lax regulation. A popular platform that starts enforcing content moderation rules may fear that it could lose users to less-regulated alternative platforms. Moreover, if users continue harmful activities on other platforms, regulation ends up being futile. This article examines the competitive aspect of content moderation by considering the motivations of all involved players (platformer, news source, and social media users), identifying the regulation policies sustained in equilibrium, and evaluating the information quality available on each platform. Applied to simple yet relevant social networks such as stochastic block models, our model reveals the conditions for a popular platform to enforce strict regulation without losing users. Effectiveness of regulation depends on the diffusive property of news posts, friend interaction qualities in social media, the sizes and cohesiveness of communities, and how much sympathizers appreciate surprising news from influencers. |
| title | Misinformation Regulation in the Presence of Competition between Social Media Platforms (Extended Version) |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Social and Information Networks |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.09639 |