Backdoor Attack against One-Class Sequential Anomaly Detection Models

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Cheng, He, Yuan, Shuhan
Format: Preprint
Published: 2024
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author Cheng, He
Yuan, Shuhan
author_facet Cheng, He
Yuan, Shuhan
contents Deep anomaly detection on sequential data has garnered significant attention due to the wide application scenarios. However, deep learning-based models face a critical security threat - their vulnerability to backdoor attacks. In this paper, we explore compromising deep sequential anomaly detection models by proposing a novel backdoor attack strategy. The attack approach comprises two primary steps, trigger generation and backdoor injection. Trigger generation is to derive imperceptible triggers by crafting perturbed samples from the benign normal data, of which the perturbed samples are still normal. The backdoor injection is to properly inject the backdoor triggers to comprise the model only for the samples with triggers. The experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed attack strategy by injecting backdoors on two well-established one-class anomaly detection models.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2402_10283
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Backdoor Attack against One-Class Sequential Anomaly Detection Models
Cheng, He
Yuan, Shuhan
Machine Learning
Artificial Intelligence
Cryptography and Security
Information Theory
Deep anomaly detection on sequential data has garnered significant attention due to the wide application scenarios. However, deep learning-based models face a critical security threat - their vulnerability to backdoor attacks. In this paper, we explore compromising deep sequential anomaly detection models by proposing a novel backdoor attack strategy. The attack approach comprises two primary steps, trigger generation and backdoor injection. Trigger generation is to derive imperceptible triggers by crafting perturbed samples from the benign normal data, of which the perturbed samples are still normal. The backdoor injection is to properly inject the backdoor triggers to comprise the model only for the samples with triggers. The experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed attack strategy by injecting backdoors on two well-established one-class anomaly detection models.
title Backdoor Attack against One-Class Sequential Anomaly Detection Models
topic Machine Learning
Artificial Intelligence
Cryptography and Security
Information Theory
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.10283