Cover Image

The Value of Context: Human versus Black Box Evaluators

Fuente: arXiv

Saved in:

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Iakovlev, Andrei, Liang, Annie
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2024
Subjects:	Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
Tags:	Add Tag No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!

Similar Items

Artificial Intelligence Clones
by: Liang, Annie
Published: (2025)

Algorithmic Fairness and Social Welfare
by: Liang, Annie, et al.
Published: (2024)

Friend or Foe: Delegating to an AI Whose Alignment is Unknown
by: Fudenberg, Drew, et al.
Published: (2025)

Creative Ownership in the Age of AI
by: Liang, Annie, et al.
Published: (2026)

Price Stability and Improved Buyer Utility with Presentation Design: A Theoretical Study of the Amazon Buy Box
by: Friedler, Ophir, et al.
Published: (2025)

Construction of Compromise Values for Cooperative Games
by: Gilles, Robert P., et al.
Published: (2025)

Irreversible Failure Reverses the Value of Information
by: Kirk, Nicholas H.
Published: (2026)

Mechanism Design under Costly Signaling: the Value of Non-Coordination
by: Li, Yingkai, et al.
Published: (2023)

Sequential Elimination and Union Shapley Value for Group Assessment in Coalitional Games
by: Kępczyński, Piotr, et al.
Published: (2025)

Relying on the Metrics of Evaluated Agents
by: Wang, Serena, et al.
Published: (2024)

Beyond Regularity: Simple versus Optimal Mechanisms, Revisited
by: Feng, Yiding, et al.
Published: (2024)

Fair Allocation in Dynamic Mechanism Design
by: Fallah, Alireza, et al.
Published: (2024)

Ecosystem Competition and Cross-Market Subsidization: A Dynamic Theory of Platform Pricing
by: Chen, Liang
Published: (2026)

Effects of Vote Delegation in Blockchains: Who Wins?
by: Gersbach, Hans, et al.
Published: (2024)

Optimal Budget Aggregation with Star-Shaped Preference Domains
by: Brandt, Felix, et al.
Published: (2024)

Satisficing Equilibrium
by: Pradelski, Bary S. R., et al.
Published: (2024)

Centralization in Attester-Proposer Separation
by: Pai, Mallesh, et al.
Published: (2024)

Revisiting the Primitives of Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
by: Ganesh, Aadityan, et al.
Published: (2024)

Continuous-Time Best-Response and Related Dynamics in Tullock Contests with Convex Costs
by: Elkind, Edith, et al.
Published: (2024)

Fair Division of Chores with Budget Constraints
by: Elkind, Edith, et al.
Published: (2024)

Coarse Q-learning: Indifference, Indeterminacy, and Instability
by: Jehiel, Philippe, et al.
Published: (2024)

Shill-Proof Auctions
by: Komo, Andrew, et al.
Published: (2024)

The Squared Kemeny Rule for Averaging Rankings
by: Lederer, Patrick, et al.
Published: (2024)

Optimizing Exit Queues for Proof-of-Stake Blockchains: A Mechanism Design Approach
by: Neuder, Michael, et al.
Published: (2024)

Counting steps for re-stabilization in a labor matching market
by: Bonifacio, Agustin G., et al.
Published: (2024)

To Spend or to Gain: Online Learning in Repeated Karma Auctions
by: Berriaud, Damien, et al.
Published: (2024)

Federated Learning and Free-riding in a Competitive Market
by: Meng, Jiajun, et al.
Published: (2024)

Impartial Selection Under Combinatorial Constraints
by: Cembrano, Javier, et al.
Published: (2024)

Computing Most Equitable Voting Rules
by: Xia, Lirong
Published: (2024)

A Dynamic Matching Framework for Faster Child Adoptions
by: Highsmith, Terence
Published: (2024)

Multidimensional Screening with Precise Seller Information
by: Frick, Mira, et al.
Published: (2024)

Characterizing the top trading cycles rule for housing markets with lexicographic preferences
by: Klaus, Bettina
Published: (2024)

Lattice operations for the pairwise stable set in many-to-many markets via re-equilibration dynamics
by: Bonifacio, Agustin G., et al.
Published: (2024)

Calibrated Forecasting and Persuasion
by: Jain, Atulya, et al.
Published: (2024)

Strategic Bidding in Knapsack Auctions
by: Khezr, Peyman, et al.
Published: (2024)

Fragile Stable Matchings
by: Rudov, Kirill
Published: (2024)

Robust Price Discrimination
by: Arieli, Itai, et al.
Published: (2024)

Approximately Fair and Population Consistent Budget Division via Simple Payment Schemes
by: Aziz, Haris, et al.
Published: (2024)

Single-token vs Two-token Blockchain Tokenomics
by: Kiayias, Aggelos, et al.
Published: (2024)

Voting with Partial Orders: The Plurality and Anti-Plurality Classes
by: Endriss, Ulle, et al.
Published: (2024)