Weighted Myerson value for Network games
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , , , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2024
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | |
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| _version_ | 1866910335331467264 |
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| author | Kakoty, Niharika Borkotokey, Surajit Kumar, Rajnish Bora, Abhijit |
| author_facet | Kakoty, Niharika Borkotokey, Surajit Kumar, Rajnish Bora, Abhijit |
| contents | We study the weighted Myerson value for Network games extending a similar concept for communication situations. Network games, unlike communication situations, treat direct and indirect links among players differently and distinguish their effects in both worth generation and allocation processes. The weighted Myerson value is an allocation rule for Network games that generalizes the Myerson value of Network games. Here, the players are assumed to have some weights measuring their capacity to form links with other players. Two characterization of the weighted Myerson value are provided. Finally, we propose a bidding mechanism to show that the weighted Myerson value is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium under a non-cooperative framework. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2402_11464 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Weighted Myerson value for Network games Kakoty, Niharika Borkotokey, Surajit Kumar, Rajnish Bora, Abhijit Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory 91A12 We study the weighted Myerson value for Network games extending a similar concept for communication situations. Network games, unlike communication situations, treat direct and indirect links among players differently and distinguish their effects in both worth generation and allocation processes. The weighted Myerson value is an allocation rule for Network games that generalizes the Myerson value of Network games. Here, the players are assumed to have some weights measuring their capacity to form links with other players. Two characterization of the weighted Myerson value are provided. Finally, we propose a bidding mechanism to show that the weighted Myerson value is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium under a non-cooperative framework. |
| title | Weighted Myerson value for Network games |
| topic | Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory 91A12 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.11464 |