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Main Authors: Au, Pak Hung, Whitmeyer, Mark
Format: Preprint
Published: 2024
Subjects:
Online Access:https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.11754
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author Au, Pak Hung
Whitmeyer, Mark
author_facet Au, Pak Hung
Whitmeyer, Mark
contents We study the ramifications of increased commitment power for information provision in an oligopolistic market with search frictions. Although prices are posted and, therefore, guide search, if firms cannot commit to information provision policies, there is no active search at equilibrium so consumers visit (and purchase from) at most one firm. If firms can guide search by both their prices and information policies, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium exhibiting price dispersion and active search. Nevertheless, when the market is thin, consumers prefer the former case, which features intense price competition. Firms always prefer the latter.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2402_11754
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Attraction Via Prices and Information
Au, Pak Hung
Whitmeyer, Mark
Theoretical Economics
We study the ramifications of increased commitment power for information provision in an oligopolistic market with search frictions. Although prices are posted and, therefore, guide search, if firms cannot commit to information provision policies, there is no active search at equilibrium so consumers visit (and purchase from) at most one firm. If firms can guide search by both their prices and information policies, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium exhibiting price dispersion and active search. Nevertheless, when the market is thin, consumers prefer the former case, which features intense price competition. Firms always prefer the latter.
title Attraction Via Prices and Information
topic Theoretical Economics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.11754