SCARF: Securing Chips with a Robust Framework against Fabrication-time Hardware Trojans
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866917760441778176 |
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| author | Eslami, Mohammad Ghasempouri, Tara Pagliarini, Samuel |
| author_facet | Eslami, Mohammad Ghasempouri, Tara Pagliarini, Samuel |
| contents | The globalization of the semiconductor industry has introduced security challenges to Integrated Circuits (ICs), particularly those related to the threat of Hardware Trojans (HTs) - malicious logic that can be introduced during IC fabrication. While significant efforts are directed towards verifying the correctness and reliability of ICs, their security is often overlooked. In this paper, we propose a comprehensive approach to enhance IC security from the front-end to back-end stages of design. Initially, we outline a systematic method to transform existing verification assets into potent security checkers by repurposing verification assertions. To further improve security, we introduce an innovative technique for integrating online monitors during physical synthesis - a back-end insertion providing an additional layer of defense. Experimental results demonstrate a significant increase in security, measured by our introduced metric, Security Coverage (SC), with a marginal rise in area and power consumption, typically under 20%. The insertion of online monitors during physical synthesis enhances security metrics by up to 33.5%. This holistic approach offers a comprehensive and resilient defense mechanism across the entire spectrum of IC design. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2402_12162 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | SCARF: Securing Chips with a Robust Framework against Fabrication-time Hardware Trojans Eslami, Mohammad Ghasempouri, Tara Pagliarini, Samuel Cryptography and Security Hardware Architecture The globalization of the semiconductor industry has introduced security challenges to Integrated Circuits (ICs), particularly those related to the threat of Hardware Trojans (HTs) - malicious logic that can be introduced during IC fabrication. While significant efforts are directed towards verifying the correctness and reliability of ICs, their security is often overlooked. In this paper, we propose a comprehensive approach to enhance IC security from the front-end to back-end stages of design. Initially, we outline a systematic method to transform existing verification assets into potent security checkers by repurposing verification assertions. To further improve security, we introduce an innovative technique for integrating online monitors during physical synthesis - a back-end insertion providing an additional layer of defense. Experimental results demonstrate a significant increase in security, measured by our introduced metric, Security Coverage (SC), with a marginal rise in area and power consumption, typically under 20%. The insertion of online monitors during physical synthesis enhances security metrics by up to 33.5%. This holistic approach offers a comprehensive and resilient defense mechanism across the entire spectrum of IC design. |
| title | SCARF: Securing Chips with a Robust Framework against Fabrication-time Hardware Trojans |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Hardware Architecture |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.12162 |