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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Galichon, Alfred, Jacquet, Antoine
Format: Preprint
Published: 2024
Subjects:
Online Access:https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.12200
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author Galichon, Alfred
Jacquet, Antoine
author_facet Galichon, Alfred
Jacquet, Antoine
contents Matching problems with linearly transferable utility (LTU) generalize the well-studied transferable utility (TU) case by relaxing the assumption that utility is transferred one-for-one within matched pairs. We show that LTU matching problems can be reframed as nonzero-sum games between two players, thus generalizing a result from von Neumann. The underlying linear programming structure of TU matching problems, however, is lost when moving to LTU. These results draw a new bridge between non-TU matching problems and the theory of bimatrix games, with consequences notably regarding the computation of stable outcomes.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2402_12200
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle The matching problem with linear transfers is equivalent to a hide-and-seek game
Galichon, Alfred
Jacquet, Antoine
Theoretical Economics
Matching problems with linearly transferable utility (LTU) generalize the well-studied transferable utility (TU) case by relaxing the assumption that utility is transferred one-for-one within matched pairs. We show that LTU matching problems can be reframed as nonzero-sum games between two players, thus generalizing a result from von Neumann. The underlying linear programming structure of TU matching problems, however, is lost when moving to LTU. These results draw a new bridge between non-TU matching problems and the theory of bimatrix games, with consequences notably regarding the computation of stable outcomes.
title The matching problem with linear transfers is equivalent to a hide-and-seek game
topic Theoretical Economics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.12200