Revisiting the Impact of Upstream Mergers with Downstream Complements and Substitutes
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866908481141866496 |
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| author | Ide, Enrique |
| author_facet | Ide, Enrique |
| contents | I examine how upstream mergers affect negotiated prices when suppliers bargain with a monopoly intermediary selling products to final consumers. Conventional wisdom holds that such transactions lower negotiated prices when the products are complements for consumers and raise them when they are substitutes. The idea is that consumer demand relationships carry over to upstream negotiations, where mergers between complements weaken the suppliers' bargaining leverage, while mergers between substitutes strengthen it. I challenge this view, showing that it breaks down when the intermediary sells products beyond those of the merging suppliers. In such cases, the merging suppliers' products may act as substitutes for the intermediary even if they are complements for consumers, or as complements for the intermediary even if they are substitutes for consumers. These findings show that upstream conglomerate mergers can raise prices without foreclosure or monopolisation and help explain buyer-specific price effects resulting from such mergers. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2402_12575 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Revisiting the Impact of Upstream Mergers with Downstream Complements and Substitutes Ide, Enrique General Economics Economics I examine how upstream mergers affect negotiated prices when suppliers bargain with a monopoly intermediary selling products to final consumers. Conventional wisdom holds that such transactions lower negotiated prices when the products are complements for consumers and raise them when they are substitutes. The idea is that consumer demand relationships carry over to upstream negotiations, where mergers between complements weaken the suppliers' bargaining leverage, while mergers between substitutes strengthen it. I challenge this view, showing that it breaks down when the intermediary sells products beyond those of the merging suppliers. In such cases, the merging suppliers' products may act as substitutes for the intermediary even if they are complements for consumers, or as complements for the intermediary even if they are substitutes for consumers. These findings show that upstream conglomerate mergers can raise prices without foreclosure or monopolisation and help explain buyer-specific price effects resulting from such mergers. |
| title | Revisiting the Impact of Upstream Mergers with Downstream Complements and Substitutes |
| topic | General Economics Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.12575 |