Proximal Byzantine Consensus

Fuente: arXiv
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Autores principales: Shadmon, Roy, Spencer, Daniel, Arden, Owen
Formato: Preprint
Publicado: 2024
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author Shadmon, Roy
Spencer, Daniel
Arden, Owen
author_facet Shadmon, Roy
Spencer, Daniel
Arden, Owen
contents Distributed control systems require high reliability and availability guarantees despite often being deployed at the edge of network infrastructure. Edge computing resources are less secure and less reliable than centralized resources in data centers. Replication and consensus protocols improve robustness to network faults and crashed or corrupted nodes, but these volatile environments can cause non-faulty nodes to temporarily diverge, increasing the time needed for replicas to converge on a consensus value, and give Byzantine attackers too much influence over the convergence process. This paper proposes proximal Byzantine consensus, a new approximate consensus protocol where clients use statistical models of streaming computations to decide a consensus value. In addition, it provides an interval around the decision value and the probability that the true (non-faulty, noise-free) value falls within this interval. Proximal consensus (PC) tolerates unreliable network conditions, Byzantine behavior, and other sources of noise that cause honest replica states to diverge. We evaluate our approach for scalar values, and compare PC simulations against a vector consensus (VC) protocol simulation. Our simulations demonstrate that consensus values selected by PC have lower error and are more robust against Byzantine attacks. We formally characterize the security guarantees against Byzantine attacks and demonstrate attacker influence is bound with high probability. Additionally, an informal complexity analysis suggests PC scales better to higher dimensions than convex hull-based protocols such as VC.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2402_12577
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Proximal Byzantine Consensus
Shadmon, Roy
Spencer, Daniel
Arden, Owen
Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing
Distributed control systems require high reliability and availability guarantees despite often being deployed at the edge of network infrastructure. Edge computing resources are less secure and less reliable than centralized resources in data centers. Replication and consensus protocols improve robustness to network faults and crashed or corrupted nodes, but these volatile environments can cause non-faulty nodes to temporarily diverge, increasing the time needed for replicas to converge on a consensus value, and give Byzantine attackers too much influence over the convergence process. This paper proposes proximal Byzantine consensus, a new approximate consensus protocol where clients use statistical models of streaming computations to decide a consensus value. In addition, it provides an interval around the decision value and the probability that the true (non-faulty, noise-free) value falls within this interval. Proximal consensus (PC) tolerates unreliable network conditions, Byzantine behavior, and other sources of noise that cause honest replica states to diverge. We evaluate our approach for scalar values, and compare PC simulations against a vector consensus (VC) protocol simulation. Our simulations demonstrate that consensus values selected by PC have lower error and are more robust against Byzantine attacks. We formally characterize the security guarantees against Byzantine attacks and demonstrate attacker influence is bound with high probability. Additionally, an informal complexity analysis suggests PC scales better to higher dimensions than convex hull-based protocols such as VC.
title Proximal Byzantine Consensus
topic Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.12577