Defending Jailbreak Prompts via In-Context Adversarial Game

Fuente: arXiv
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Auteurs principaux: Zhou, Yujun, Han, Yufei, Zhuang, Haomin, Guo, Kehan, Liang, Zhenwen, Bao, Hongyan, Zhang, Xiangliang
Format: Preprint
Publié: 2024
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author Zhou, Yujun
Han, Yufei
Zhuang, Haomin
Guo, Kehan
Liang, Zhenwen
Bao, Hongyan
Zhang, Xiangliang
author_facet Zhou, Yujun
Han, Yufei
Zhuang, Haomin
Guo, Kehan
Liang, Zhenwen
Bao, Hongyan
Zhang, Xiangliang
contents Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate remarkable capabilities across diverse applications. However, concerns regarding their security, particularly the vulnerability to jailbreak attacks, persist. Drawing inspiration from adversarial training in deep learning and LLM agent learning processes, we introduce the In-Context Adversarial Game (ICAG) for defending against jailbreaks without the need for fine-tuning. ICAG leverages agent learning to conduct an adversarial game, aiming to dynamically extend knowledge to defend against jailbreaks. Unlike traditional methods that rely on static datasets, ICAG employs an iterative process to enhance both the defense and attack agents. This continuous improvement process strengthens defenses against newly generated jailbreak prompts. Our empirical studies affirm ICAG's efficacy, where LLMs safeguarded by ICAG exhibit significantly reduced jailbreak success rates across various attack scenarios. Moreover, ICAG demonstrates remarkable transferability to other LLMs, indicating its potential as a versatile defense mechanism.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2402_13148
institution arXiv
publishDate 2024
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Defending Jailbreak Prompts via In-Context Adversarial Game
Zhou, Yujun
Han, Yufei
Zhuang, Haomin
Guo, Kehan
Liang, Zhenwen
Bao, Hongyan
Zhang, Xiangliang
Machine Learning
Cryptography and Security
Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate remarkable capabilities across diverse applications. However, concerns regarding their security, particularly the vulnerability to jailbreak attacks, persist. Drawing inspiration from adversarial training in deep learning and LLM agent learning processes, we introduce the In-Context Adversarial Game (ICAG) for defending against jailbreaks without the need for fine-tuning. ICAG leverages agent learning to conduct an adversarial game, aiming to dynamically extend knowledge to defend against jailbreaks. Unlike traditional methods that rely on static datasets, ICAG employs an iterative process to enhance both the defense and attack agents. This continuous improvement process strengthens defenses against newly generated jailbreak prompts. Our empirical studies affirm ICAG's efficacy, where LLMs safeguarded by ICAG exhibit significantly reduced jailbreak success rates across various attack scenarios. Moreover, ICAG demonstrates remarkable transferability to other LLMs, indicating its potential as a versatile defense mechanism.
title Defending Jailbreak Prompts via In-Context Adversarial Game
topic Machine Learning
Cryptography and Security
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.13148