Stable matching as transport
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2024
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | |
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| _version_ | 1866917956346183680 |
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| author | Echenique, Federico Root, Joseph Sandomirskiy, Fedor |
| author_facet | Echenique, Federico Root, Joseph Sandomirskiy, Fedor |
| contents | This paper links matching markets with aligned preferences to optimal transport theory. We show that stability, efficiency, and fairness emerge as solutions to a parametric family of optimal transport problems. The parameter reflects society's preferences for inequality. This link offers insights into structural properties of matchings and trade-offs between objectives; showing how stability can lead to welfare inequalities, even among similar agents. Our model captures supply-demand imbalances in contexts like spatial markets, school choice, and ride-sharing. We also show that large markets with idiosyncratic preferences can be well approximated by aligned preferences, expanding the applicability of our results. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2402_13378 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Stable matching as transport Echenique, Federico Root, Joseph Sandomirskiy, Fedor Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory 91B68, 90C08 This paper links matching markets with aligned preferences to optimal transport theory. We show that stability, efficiency, and fairness emerge as solutions to a parametric family of optimal transport problems. The parameter reflects society's preferences for inequality. This link offers insights into structural properties of matchings and trade-offs between objectives; showing how stability can lead to welfare inequalities, even among similar agents. Our model captures supply-demand imbalances in contexts like spatial markets, school choice, and ride-sharing. We also show that large markets with idiosyncratic preferences can be well approximated by aligned preferences, expanding the applicability of our results. |
| title | Stable matching as transport |
| topic | Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory 91B68, 90C08 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.13378 |