Mechanism Design with Sequential-Move Games: Revelation Principle
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2024
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| _version_ | 1866913257502015488 |
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| author | Xiong, Siyang |
| author_facet | Xiong, Siyang |
| contents | Traditionally, mechanism design focuses on simultaneous-move games (e.g., Myerson (1981)). In this paper, we study mechanism design with sequential-move games, and provide two results on revelation principles for general solution concepts (e.g., perfect Bayesian equilibrium, obvious dominance, strong-obvious dominance). First, if a solution concept is additive, implementation in sequential-move games is equivalent to implementation in simultaneous-move games. Second, for any solution concept \r{ho} and any social choice function f, we identify a canonical operator γ^{(\r{ho},f)}, which is defined on primitives. We prove that, if \r{ho} is monotonic, f can be implemented by a sequential-move game if and only if γ^{(\r{ho},f)} is achievable, which translates a complicated mechanism design problem into checking some conditions defined on primitives. Most of the existing solution concepts are either additive or monotonic. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2402_13580 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Mechanism Design with Sequential-Move Games: Revelation Principle Xiong, Siyang Theoretical Economics Traditionally, mechanism design focuses on simultaneous-move games (e.g., Myerson (1981)). In this paper, we study mechanism design with sequential-move games, and provide two results on revelation principles for general solution concepts (e.g., perfect Bayesian equilibrium, obvious dominance, strong-obvious dominance). First, if a solution concept is additive, implementation in sequential-move games is equivalent to implementation in simultaneous-move games. Second, for any solution concept \r{ho} and any social choice function f, we identify a canonical operator γ^{(\r{ho},f)}, which is defined on primitives. We prove that, if \r{ho} is monotonic, f can be implemented by a sequential-move game if and only if γ^{(\r{ho},f)} is achievable, which translates a complicated mechanism design problem into checking some conditions defined on primitives. Most of the existing solution concepts are either additive or monotonic. |
| title | Mechanism Design with Sequential-Move Games: Revelation Principle |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.13580 |